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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of the category “conservative” is common and widespread both for political 
scientists and for the general public. Yet, there doesn’t appear to be a scholarly consensus, nor 
a consensus among the general public with regard to what the primary value of conservatism is. 
There does seem to be a consensus that the best historical archetypal conservative was 
Edmund Burke. This paper examines the politics of Burke and comes to the conclusion that the 
primary value that Burke promoted throughout his career was the value of “durable 
independence”. The paper also makes the case that there is some evidence to suggest that this 
type of conservatism is both still alive today in American politics, and that it is quite popular. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Conservative” is one of the most commonly used political terms in America. Little has 
changed since 1997 when historian Jerry Z. Muller wrote, “the word “conservative” is on many 
lips—whether as a label of honor or as an epithet.”1 One finds it difficult to watch a cable news 
channel, listen to a political radio show, or read the editorial pages of a newspaper or magazine 
without “conservatives” being part of the discussion. Yet, for a word with such wide usage, a 
clear understanding of conservative ideology is remarkably elusive. 
Common usage generally places conservatives within the Republican Party. Yet even 
within the GOP, debate is persistent and pitched about who is and who isn’t a conservative. The 
pejorative term RINO (Republican In Name Only) has become synonymous with not being a 
conservative (and therefore not a Republican).2 Even the libertarian-leaning wing seems to 
prefer the label “constitutional conservative” over “classical liberal” or libertarian.3 Given these 
divergent understandings, even within the Republican Party, regarding the definition of 
conservatism, and, given the popularity of the term, discovering the roots of what it is that 
makes conservatism distinct from other ideologies seems a worthy undertaking.  
                                                          
1
 Jerry Z. Muller, An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from Hume to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press , 1997), vx. 
2
 Nella Van Dyke and David S. Meyer, Understanding the Tea Party Movement (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 
2014), 113-116. 
3
 Rand Paul, The Tea Party goes to Washington New York: Hachette Book Company, 2011), 105-129. 
2 
 
According to Samuel Huntington, an ideology is “a system of ideas concerned with the 
distribution of political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant social group.”4 This 
paper will use a similar understanding of ideology, however, the paper will assume that within 
each ideological system there is some particular value or idea that is dominant, such that, when 
situations arise in which one value conflicts with another, the value that is most consistently 
preferred over other values, is the primary value of the ideology and plays a major role in 
defining the ideology. For example, if freedom is valued more than the prevention of harm by a 
community, then they may not institute a law that requires people to wear seat belts while 
driving a car. If there are a series of decisions made by a community in which the value of 
freedom is chosen instead of some other potential value, then we could say freedom is their 
primary value, and that freedom defines their ideology. 
Though there is a great diversity of opinion within any ideology as to what the ideology 
requires in each situation, the primary values that other ideologies seek to promote, and what 
actions they therefore require are fairly clear in the main:  
Liberalism’s primary value is freedom. Promoting this value requires actions by the state 
which include enforcement of individual ownership rights and the necessary corollary rights 
which limit state action to protection against force and fraud.5 Liberalism generally takes the 
views that the a priori rights of individuals are paramount, and that consent must be given in 
order for the government to restrict individual freedom. When other values come into conflict 
with freedom, liberals tend to choose freedom. 
                                                          
4
 Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” The American Political Science Review 51, no. 2 (Jun. 1957): 
454. 
5
 Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism and its Critics (New York: New York University Press, 1984) 
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Egalitarianism’s primary value is equality. Equality requires, at the very least, equal 
access to most resources, equal concern from government officials, and equal power in 
government. There are a wide variety of formulations, but at its core, any form of 
egalitarianism will require government to aim for a high degree of equality among citizens, and 
will expect that all should be treated equally, aiming at a maximum degree of equal well-being.6 
Traditionalism requires that citizens, officials, and public institutions, all aim to continue 
whatever traditions are currently being practiced. This is required of state governments as well 
as citizens.7 
Religious Orthodoxy requires that citizens, officials, and public institutions practice and 
promote a particular religious practice or truth. Religious Orthodoxy is flexible in terms of what 
level of government it requires. Some may require only local government enforcement. Others 
may require state, national, or global government involvement.8  
Institutionalism requires that citizens and officials only alter the structure of existing 
institutions if and when the continued existence of an institution is threatened, and then only 
altered to such a degree so as to stop that threat.9 
Oligarchy requires that officials and state institutions protect the interests of those with 
large amounts of movable property, money, or capital, often by limiting political participation, 
                                                          
6
 Bruce M. Landesman, “Egalitarianism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1983): 27-56. 
7
 George Soros, The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 212. 
8
 Jerry Z. Muller, An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from Hume to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press , 1997), 4-5. 
9
 Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” The American Political Science Review 51, no. 2 (Jun. 1957): 
454-473. 
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guaranteeing the ability to conduct certain economic activities, and government assistance for 
corporations and the wealthy.10 
This thesis will argue that none of these adequately describe what it is that defines 
conservatism. The thesis will make three separate arguments that work together to support a 
larger thesis.  The larger thesis is that conservatism is a distinct ideology defined by the primary 
value of durable independence.11 The three supporting arguments are that (1) traditional 
conservatism as expressed by the conservative archetype Edmond Burke is defined by the 
primary value of durable independence, (2) that durable independence as a primary value 
exists as a living tradition in American politics today both in rhetoric and in practice, and that 
the tradition of valuing durable independence has not been relegated only to the past, and (3) 
that the value of durable independence has a wide enough acceptance both within the 
Republican Party and among the citizenry at large to exist as one of the two dominant political 
ideologies in a dichotomous political system like that found in the United States.12  
For these reasons, this thesis shall argue that when one refers to or claims the title of 
“conservative” in American politics; it is with reference to the primary value of durable 
independence they should be referring. 
  
                                                          
10
 Aristotle, Politics: 1279b5. 
11
 A more detailed definition of durable independence will come in Chapter 3, but the quick definition is the 
promotion of policies that reduce the reliance of the community and the individuals in it on chance and luck over 
the long term. In other words, it is the promotion of policies that reduce dependence on luck. 
12
 The other dominant ideology is egalitarianism and is most often promoted by members of the Democratic Party. 
Neither party, of course, has a monopoly on the views of its members. So, there may be conservatives who are 
Democrats and egalitarians who are Republicans (not to mention a wide variety of other ideological leanings). 
However, if one looks at the ideology with the most members within the Democratic Party, and the types of 
policies they promote, egalitarians will be most numerous.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
METHOD 
 
This paper will make three supporting arguments to defend the larger thesis that 
conservatism should be defined by the primary value of independence, though the three 
arguments will not be wholly dependent on one another. Since each of the three arguments is 
largely independent, each will have its own methodology. The first argument makes the 
assumption that if we are going to define conservatism we should examine what conservatism 
has traditionally meant.  
Scholars have used several methods in an effort to arrive at a satisfactory understanding 
of what defines conservatism. Those methods, for the most part, have had one of four starting 
places. They start either by identifying an individual ideal type, by identifying a group of 
acknowledged conservative principles, by describing certain common background conditions 
that produce conservatives, or by positing a unit idea that consists of one basic value that 
guides all others.13 
While an initial inquiry may start at any one of the four points mentioned, ultimately, 
the inquiry should be able to support the other potential starting points. For example, one may 
configure a group of conservative principles, and then move to a group of conservative actors, 
ultimately identifying one or more of the actors as an archetypal embodiment of all the 
                                                          
13
 Similar categories are used by David Y. Allen “Modern Conservatism: The Problem of Definition.” The Review of 
Politics 43, no. 4 (Oct. 1981): 582-603. 
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principles. Alternatively, one could identify common socio-historical conditions that produce 
conservatives, and then move to identify who those conservatives were and how their 
principals and ideas are similar. Or, one could posit a single unit idea like “conserving the status 
quo”, and then move to various conservatives and show how all their principles and actions 
served to conserve the status quo. There are a number of reasonable methods to approach the 
problem, but the best method will be the one that has the most consensus in terms of its 
starting point, and also the one that can be applied the most consistently. 
The method of this paper will be very similar to the path followed by Samuel Huntington 
when he attempted to define conservatism as an ideology.14 Nearly everyone who has 
undertaken the task of defining conservatism has considered Edmund Burke the archetypal 
conservative.15  Huntington began his inquiry with Edmund Burke. Next, Huntington derived a 
group of principles from Burke’s political thought and actions. Within this group of principles he 
found that they “all serve the over-riding purpose of justifying the established order” in terms 
of the current institutional arrangements at the time. (Later, I shall refer to this as 
institutionalism.)16  
The method of this paper will begin by combining a unit idea with an archetype. First, in 
Chapter 2, the paper will identify and define a unit idea: durable independence. Then the paper 
will identify a conservative archetype: Edmond Burke. Next, in Chapter 3, the paper will offer a 
                                                          
14
 Huntington, Samuel P. “Conservatism as an Ideology.” The American Political Science Review Vol. 51 # 2 (Jun. 
1957): 454-473. 
15
 Virtually every source in this paper (Huntington, Kirk, Allen, Manheim, Auerbach, Muller, etc.) identifies Burke as 
a central conservative figure. It would be much more difficult to find someone who did not identify Burke as a 
conservative. 
16
 This is my terminology not Huntington’s. One of the things I noticed while doing the research was that 
institutionalism was often lumped together with traditionalism. However, I think it is important to draw a 
distinction between the two. 
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definition of the term durable independence. Then the paper will show how the unit idea of 
durable independence explains the vast majority of Burke’s political thoughts and actions. The 
paper will do this in Chapter 4 by comparing the explanatory value of durable independence 
against other competing ideological explanations (Institutionalism, Traditionalism, Liberalism, 
Religious Orthodoxy, and support for Oligarchy), in an effort to both draw distinctions with 
regard to conservatism’s unique requirements and to link the primary value of durable 
independence to Burke. For example, the paper will show how durable independence does a 
better job of explaining why Burke was cautious with regard to altering existing institutions, and 
under what conditions he thought we should alter existing institutions, rather than just state 
that his conservatism was defined by the fact that he supported existing institutions (as 
Huntington proposed).  
This will conclude the argument for how conservatism should be defined using the 
traditional method. The second argument will be about whether this form of conservatism is 
still alive in practice today. If it is not still in practice today, then it may be the case that 
conservatism was once indeed defined by the primary value of durable independence, but that 
now, in practice, nobody thinks of conservatism in those terms, or even in Burkean terms. 
The method for the second supporting argument, then, will be that in both action and 
rhetoric, mostly among Republicans of the past twenty or thirty years, the value of durable 
independence has played a dominant role in elections and politics. The paper will examine four 
issues that are operational examples of how durable independence has been promoted: 
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avoidance of corporate and social welfare at the federal level, reduced federal spending, 
avoidance of unnecessary military intervention, and limited immigration.  
The paper will argue that politicians who refer to themselves as conservatives have 
rhetorically almost always promoted these four issues over the past twenty years, and that 
when they have taken rhetorical positions not consistent with these issues they have received 
very little support. This rhetorical support for issues which are likely to be those also supported 
by the value of durable independence shows that durable independence is very much a living 
tradition in American politics. 
The third supporting argument that this paper will make is that durable independence 
has widespread support both within the Republican Party and with the larger citizenry, both in 
action and rhetoric.  
Within the Republican Party the method I will use to show this is to argue that those 
who often appear to be supporting a different form of conservatism (Religious Orthodoxy, Laize 
Faire, or Neo/Oligarchic Conservatism) either (1) have almost no support within the party for 
their views in the case of Religious Orthodoxy and Laize Faire “conservatism”, or (2) when their 
policies come into conflict with durable independence there is a vocal political backlash within 
the Republican Party in the case of Neo/Oligarchic “conservatism”. 
To briefly summarize the overall method: with regard to how conservatism has been 
traditionally defined the paper begins at the point where there is the most consensus—Edmund 
Burke—and develops and describes a set of actionable principles that are rooted in the primary 
value of independence. Then, the paper makes the argument that the value of durable 
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independence is likely still alive and well in American politics. Lastly, the paper argues that 
durable independence has a much wider appeal both rhetorically and in practice than other 
potential types of conservatism, and that because of all these arguments, when we refer to 
“conservatives” in America, we should be referring to those people whose primary value is 
durable independence.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
DEFINING DURABLE INDEPENDENCE 
 
The basic definition of durable independence is rooted in the biological process of life. A 
biological understanding of independence can be described something like this: Independence 
is a relative state achieved by action that has the effect of reducing the chaotic movement of 
matter and subjecting it to an entity’s will. Understood this way, independence is measured on 
a continuous scale. The less an entity’s state is subject to the chance and chaos of the 
surrounding environment, and the more control the entity has over the homeostatic 
environment contained within itself, the more independent the entity is. Given this definition, 
all life is an expression of independence. The regulation of an entity’s body, procreation, and 
the replication of an entity’s genetic material are actions that serve to increase an entity’s 
relative state of independence and make it more durable. Independence, understood this way, 
in its most basic form, can be observed in the difference between living and non-living objects. 
And so long as we think living objects are more valuable than non-living ones by virtue of the 
living object’s independence, we place normative weight on the achievement of more durable 
states of relative independence. 
There are three basic principles that conservatism derives or assumes from the value of 
life. The first is the assumption that there is a creative force that made life possible. Edmond 
Burke—whose thoughts we will examine more closely in the next section of this paper—
attributed the creative force of life to God. In doing so, Burke rejected skepticism and 
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materialism. Russell Kirk properly acknowledges Burke’s basic position that acknowledging the 
creative force of God is necessary and that “The sentimental advocacy of indiscriminately 
generous human sympathies, or the prevalence of universal pity, cannot suffice to save a 
society which has denied its divine ordination.”17 18 
Kirk ultimately forms a stronger more orthodox definition of conservatism with which 
this paper disagrees, but the basic foundation of acknowledgment of a higher power being the 
driving force behind life is the first principle of conservatism and it distinguishes it from a 
variety of skeptical and materialist ideologies. 
Another principle that can be derived from understanding durable independence is the 
promotion of policies and structures that reduce arbitrariness via a willful prudence. 
Independence is achieved when an entity has reduced the arbitrariness and chaos of the 
surrounding environment. States of independence exist on a spectrum. For humans, actions 
guided by passions, appetites and chance, fall on the arbitrary and bad end of the spectrum, 
while actions guided by reason and historical experience fall on the good end of the spectrum.19 
Ultimately, independence is a state that is made, maintained, and defined by departure from 
                                                          
17
 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind 7
th
 ed. (Washington D.C.: Regency Publishing, 1953 (2001 printing)), 33. 
18
 “I have observed that the philosophers in order to insinuate their polluted atheism into young minds 
systematically flatter all their passions natural and unnatural. They explode or render odious or contemptible that 
class of virtues which restrain the appetite…In place of all this they substitute a virtue which they call humanity or 
benevolence. By this means their morality has no idea in it of restraint, or indeed of a distinct settled principle of 
any kind.” –Burke to the Chevalier de Rivarol, 1791 (Wentworth Woodhouse Papers, Book I, 623) 
19
 They should be ordered by their probabilities of creating a durable independent state. So, a wise and prudent 
action will have a greater probability of success than one chosen by appetite or passion. This doesn’t mean that 
much of the time appetites, passions and instincts produce durable independent states better than random luck. 
They do. Most life forms use a small amount of reason compared to humans, but the very fact that they are alive is 
good, even if their life is mostly determined by appetites, they just aren’t as good as states created by reason, 
wisdom, and prudence, because actions guided by those virtues have a higher probability of reducing arbitrariness 
than appetites and passions and instincts do in most cases. 
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arbitrariness. Nonliving objects are guided by arbitrary chance. Living things are guided by 
reason, which, when combined with wisdom and prudence, can reduce arbitrariness.  
For example, if a farmer experiences favorable weather one year and has a surplus 
of grain, a prudent farmer might build a silo in which to store the excess grain. This is an act 
of willful prudence that increases independence because it makes the farmer less 
dependent on the arbitrary actions of the weather in subsequent years. If a drought or 
flood ruins the next year’s harvest, the farmer can maintain his relative well-being (a state 
of independence) with the grain he prudently stored away.  
It is worth noting that independence falls on a practically infinite continuum. There 
is no material ideal that one can reach or realistically expect to meet (like there is with 
equality, for example). An entity either becomes more independent with any given action or 
less independent. The idea is to use reason and experience instead of chance to try to 
become more independent than one otherwise would have been if things were left solely 
up to chance, passions, or appetites.  
The concept integral to defining durable independence is durability. Becoming 
independent for a short time is good, but staying relatively independent for a longer time is 
better. Because of this, conservatives recognize and value biological and social continuity. 
They recognize that we owe much of who we are to our biological and social ancestors, and 
the very fact that we exist was at least partially determined by the decisions ancestors 
made and the cultural practices they adopted. Burke, perhaps more clearly than anyone, 
understood the reality of this and admonished those who denied it: “thus the whole chain 
13 
 
and continuity of the commonwealth would be broke; no one generation could link with the 
other; men would become little better than the flies of a summer.”20  
This continuum creates prima facie obligations to the family and community into 
which one is born. This recognition allows conservatives to avoid moral relativism when it 
comes to different countries and cultures because conservatives believe each person has 
unique duties to their own community; past, present, and future. Society was not “a 
partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and 
perishable nature,” but instead “a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a 
partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection.” It was “a partnership not only between 
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who 
are to be born.”21 This value of the continuity of life, the people and practices that have 
made it durable up to any particular time, and the people and practices that are likely to 
make it continue into the future, is at its core a value of durability with regard to 
independence. 
                                                          
20
Edmund Burke, Reflections Works, III. 357-359. 
21
 Edmund Burke, Reflections, Works, III, 359. 
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Figure 1. Visual Representation of Durable Independence  
The concept of durable independence is displayed visually in the graph above. The 
horizontal axis shows the degree of dependence vs. independence and the vertical axis is a 
durability multiplier. The states that fall in the top right quadrant would be those that 
express a high amount of independence and who do so for a long period of time. The states 
that fall in the top left quadrant would be the worst outcomes. Slavery that persists for 
many generations would be an example of an institution that belongs in the top left 
because people would be living in a state of dependence for long periods of time. 
Revolutions that produce short-term results would fall in the lower right quadrant. While 
such revolutions may be good if they remove people from a state of enduring dependence, 
that goodness is tempered if the independence is short-lived. The occupiers of the bottom 
left quadrant are often children or people in need of temporary aid. They are dependent, 
15 
 
but it is short-lasting, and ultimately, in an ideal world, they take steps to move toward the 
top right quadrant. 
Also connected to the value of durability is a value for institutions. Individuals and 
families come and go, but institutions have the potential to make society more durable. 
Conservatives value institutions for this reason, especially if those institutions are aiming to 
make people become more independent than they otherwise would have been without the 
institutions in place. In other words, if those institutions attempt to reduce the arbitrariness 
of the world, or peoples’ appetites and passions (which are more likely to lead to arbitrary 
states) then they will be very important institutions for conservatives. And if conservatives 
seek to change an institution, it would only be when the institution had become subject to 
an unacceptable amount of arbitrariness, either by lack of prudence, or by excessive 
passion, or appetites.  
None of the principles derived from the value of durable independence so far have 
been especially unique to modern conservatism. Before the modern period, many 
philosophers valued God’s creative force, and valued prudence, hereditary and social ties, 
and durable government institutions. Other periods also reviled arbitrariness and decisions 
driven by passion and appetites. And none seemed to place a high value on short-lived 
institutions (if there is such a thing). We might call these values “classical” conservatism. 
One of the unique features that distinguish Burke’s thought—and the feature that 
helps make his thought modern—is Burke’s recognition that money should be valued as a 
way to promote durable independence. In classical thought, money wasn’t something to be 
16 
 
valued the same way a title to land or office was. There was nothing particularly virtuous 
about money. What Burke realized, however, was that money not only could be used as a 
simple means to commensurate exchange in the Aristotelean sense, but that money and 
freer trade held the potential to make independence more durable. 
If, for example, we take the farmer from earlier in this paper, we can see how this 
works in practice. If in a given year the farmer produces a surplus crop, yet in some other 
part of the world there is a drought, the farmer can sell their surplus grain in exchange for 
money. Then, if the farmer’s situation is reversed the next year, the farmer can take the 
money that he saved from selling his surplus grain the previous year and purchase the grain 
he needs on the market. In addition to this, if the farmer instead needed medicine, or 
machinery, or some other service that would enhance the independence and well-being of 
his family, then he could spend his money on that as well.  
Looking at money in this way might seem very obvious for some, but it is important 
to note that for conservatives the value of money isn’t derived from an a priori right. The 
value of money is rooted in the money’s potential to make independence more durable.  
To sum up, there is one primary value derived from the recognition of the value of 
life: durable independence. There are three basic principles used by Burke that explain 
durable independence. The first (1) is acknowledgement that life was created by God. The 
second (2) is that both internal and external states produced by arbitrary, passionate, and 
appetite-driven processes are bad and that states produced via reason and prudence, which 
reduce arbitrary states that would have otherwise been present, are good. The third (3) is 
17 
 
that durability, with regard to independence, is good. Valuing durability leads to three sub-
principles. (3.1) Humans exist in a biological and social continuum, not as isolated 
individuals, and that is good because it makes our independence more durable. (3.2) 
Institutions can serve to increase the wisdom and prudence of society which in turn 
enhance the durability of independence. (3.3) Money has the potential to make 
independence more durable as well by acting as a potential storage mechanism for 
independence. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CONSERVATIVE DISTINCTIONS 
 
Conservativism’s Coherence 
There are those who reject that there is a consistent, or coherent, conservative 
ideology. Their view is that conservatism is sometimes one thing, sometimes another, and 
that because of this, conservatism is either an illusion, or has no consistent guiding principle 
or set of ideas. Others think conservatism is just an attitude. Their arguments all boil down 
to the opinion that conservatism is internally incoherent and therefore has no primary value 
that it is promoting.  
Morton Auerbach argues that conservatism has historically tried to represent itself 
as an ideology that supports Platonic harmony, but that Burke could not, while remaining 
consistent, deny the cause of French Revolution while defending the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 in England. In order to support the theory that Burke adhered to a form of Platonic 
harmony, Auerbach mostly references Burke’s single work on aesthetic philosophy, and 
occasionally references Burke’s satirical work.22 These are not the best sources from which 
to understand Burke’s thought, however, because one must either subjectively transfer 
Burke’s aesthetic philosophy to politics in the first case, or interpret what is ultimately a 
work of literature that can have multiple interpretations with regard to specifics (though 
the general message is quite clear) in the second case. Ultimately, Auerbach glosses over 
                                                          
22
 Morton M. Auerbach,  The Conservative Illusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 31-68. 
19 
 
the fact that Burke never referred to Plato positively in his writings, and instead preferred a 
more Aristocratic approach to politics.23 It apparently never occurred to Auerbach that it 
wasn’t that Burke was being inconsistent with his politics, but just that Auerbach had 
completely misinterpreted Burke. If Burke was not a Platonist, one would not expect his 
politics to be consistent with Platonic harmony. That doesn’t mean that conservatism 
doesn’t exist and is just an illusion, as Auerbach asserts. It just means that Auerbach failed 
to properly identify conservatism’s basic principles, or primary idea. Essentially, Auerbach 
simultaneously describes Burke as a traditionalist and as someone who wants to preserve 
his primary value of Platonic harmony, yet Auerbach also describes Burke as a liberal. It is 
fairly clear that Burke was not a Platonist, but if we assume that Burke was still a 
traditionalist (defending Britain’s institutions instead of harmony, perhaps) then it still could 
be that Burke is being inconsistent with his (supposedly) liberal values, and that there is a 
tension between Burke’s traditionalism and liberalism. 
Alasdair MacIntyre adopts this point of view: 
Traditions, when vital, embody continuities of conflict. 
Indeed, when a tradition becomes Burkean, it is always dying or 
dead. 
The individualism of modernity could of course find no use 
for the notion of tradition within its own conceptual scheme 
except as an adversary notion; it therefore all too willingly 
                                                          
23
 Burke refers positively to Aristotle throughout his career and a close examination reveals a much stronger 
connection to Aristotle’s thought than Plato’s. Other scholars have thought so as well: Leo Strauss, Natural Right & 
History (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 303. Also see: Ross Hoffman, J.S. Ed. Burke’s Politics: 
Selected Writing and Speeches (New York: Knopf, 1949), Xvi. 
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abandoned it to the Burkeans, who, faithful to Burke’s own 
allegiance, tried to combine adherence in politics to a conception 
of tradition which would vindicate the oligarchical revolution of 
property of 1688 and adherence in economics to the doctrine and 
institutions of the free market. The theoretical incoherence of this 
mismatch did not deprive it of ideological usefulness. But the 
outcome has been that modern conservatives are for the most 
part engaged in conserving only older rather than later versions of 
individual liberalism. Their own core doctrine is as liberal and 
individualistic as that of self-avowed liberals.24 
According to MacIntyre, Burke cannot coherently support both the traditions that 
would vindicate the Revolution of 1688 and free market economics. My view is that Burke 
was neither a liberal nor a traditionalist. Let’s discuss the traditionalist argument first. 
Traditionalism, in order to be coherent, must preserve the traditions and basic public policy 
that is presently in place. What MacIntyre recognized is that nowadays “conservatives” 
have resorted to trying to revive an older form of liberalism, and essentially become 
reactionaries. When that happens there is no continuity of tradition. The tradition is already 
dead. I would add that this type of traditionalism cannot be a coherent ideology anyway 
because there is no guiding principle or idea that points to exactly what point in the past we 
should revive. Without that guiding principle, two sets of traditionalists can simultaneously 
promote opposite policies from various points in the past while both claim to be 
traditionalists.  
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For example, in the early days of America there were no federal restrictions on 
alcohol. Then, for a time, we had federal prohibition of alcohol. Still later, we abolished the 
prohibition. If a traditionalist was going to use traditionalism to help them decide whether 
or not we should prohibit alcohol at the federal level, the traditionalist would have no 
guidance from their ideology at all unless their policy is to always keep whatever policy 
happens to be in place at the moment. There are traditionalists of this type. People who 
simply do not like change at all. Burke was not one of those people, though. He advocated 
changing the court’s role in elections25, expanding representation to Americans26, changing 
laws against persecution of Catholics27, and freer trade policies28, among other things. It is 
impossible to call Burke a traditionalist in this sense. He advocated for change in policy 
quite often. 
The question now arises, if Burke was a conservative, but wasn’t a Platonist who 
valued social harmony above all else, and he wasn’t a traditionalist who opposed all change 
from the present, yet he still had a coherent ideology, what could explain his actions? I will 
answer this in due time, but the reasons put forth thus far that declare Burkean 
conservatism inconsistent or incoherent because it is Platonistic or traditionalistic have not 
held up. I have yet to show conservatism’s consistency, but it is not inconsistent for Platonic 
or traditionalistic reasons. 
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Distinctions between Religious Orthodoxy, Liberalism and Conservatism 
Thus far, I have defined durable independence and examined the views of those who 
deny conservatism’s coherence. Now I will discuss the views of those who accept that there is a 
consistent and coherent ideology of Burkean conservatism, but who disagree about whether or 
not durable independence is the primary value of Burkean conservatism. 
The best known proponent of the religious orthodox view of Burkean conservatism is 
Russell Kirk. In Kirk’s book Conservative Mind he makes a strong case that in Burke’s view, 
religious institutions and the state itself are ordained by God.29  I have no objection with this 
interpretation of Burke in its weaker form, but Kirk wishes to make a stronger case than simply 
God created life and that society should provide for religious institutions. 
While Burke would sometimes refer to providence as an explanation for outcomes, 
he was much more focused on earthly utility, and much more modest with regard to the 
dictates of God than Kirk makes him out be. Muller explains the difference between Burke’s 
view and the orthodoxy view well in this passage: “The orthodox theoretician defends 
existing institutions because they are metaphysically true: the truth claimed may be based 
on particular revelation or on natural laws purportedly accessible to all rational men, it may 
be religious or secular in origin. The conservative defends existing institutions because their 
very existence creates a presumption that they have served some useful function…”30 Kirk, 
and other proponents of the religious orthodox position, fail to recognize that Burke, while 
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a Christian, almost always defended his positions on the grounds of their earthly utility, not 
on the grounds that the government should be helping people aim at heavenly happiness in 
the afterlife.  
Conservatives tend to acknowledge the existence of a transcendental order, yet 
tend to be very modest when attempting to implement that order through the government. 
Conservatives support long lasting religious institutions, yet allow for a plurality of such 
institutions. This account helps explain why Burke offered his support for Catholics in 
Ireland, when, on an orthodox account of conservatism, Burke should have been supporting 
the punitive laws that had been in effect as a way to push Catholics away from their religion 
and toward the Church of England. In speaking against the anti-popery laws in Ireland, 
Burke said “For the Protestant religion, nor (I speak it with reverence, I am sure) the truth of 
our common Christianity, is not so clear as this proposition: That all men, at least the 
majority of men in society, ought to enjoy the common advantages of it.”31 In other words, 
there are certain basic principles dealing with common goods that we know more clearly 
than precise Christian truths. Even Kirk admits that in Burke’s view “Christianity is the 
highest of religions; but every sincere mundane order is a recognition of divine purpose in 
the universe…”32 This is hardly an orthodox or fundamentalist view of religion’s role in 
government.33 It is difficult to imagine the fundamentalists in America today agreeing that 
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other religions are good, but Christianity is just better. What they tend to argue is that 
Christianity is true and other religions are false, and, that therefore the government should 
play a significant role in promoting only that truth. 
Burke supported the Church of England, but it is best to look at the reasons Burke 
defends the English Church as given by himself. “The people of England think that they have 
constitutional motives, as well as religious, against any project of turning their independent 
clergy into ecclesiastical pensioners of state. They tremble for their liberty, from the influence 
of a clergy dependent on the crown; they tremble for the public tranquility, for the disorders of 
a factious clergy, if it were made to depend upon any other than the crown. They therefore 
made their Church, like their king and their nobility, independent.”34 Burke’s practical reason 
for defending the structure of the Church of England was to maintain the church’s 
independence. In this we see a consistent value. First, there is the value that life is a form of 
independence and an assumption that it was provided for by God. The second is that religious 
institutions should be arranged to be as independent as possible as well. Durable independence 
underlies both these positions. 
For Burke, religious institutions are necessary for civil society and they should be as 
independent and durable as possible, but we should allow other religious institutions if they are 
long-established because they have proved themselves useful at promoting independence for a 
political community. These views are not the views of fundamentalism or religious orthodoxy. 
They require something quite different. 
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They also create a unique flexibility with regard to public policy. Take the issue of 
gay marriage, for example. Using the current rhetoric in American politics, the 
“conservative” position with regard to whether or not to allow gay couples to marry is to 
oppose it. I will set to one side the legal debates, and instead focus purely on the policy 
debate. The question before us is whether to allow gay marriage or not. And we want to 
know what sort of guidance conservatism might offer with regard to this question. 
The religious orthodox view is fairly simple and is something like: Our religion says 
that gay marriage is bad or forbidden, and so we should use the law to forbid gay marriage.  
This is not, however, the conservative position. While conservatives do acknowledge 
that religion and metaphysics exist, conservatives are modest when it comes to man’s 
ability to understand and/or implement these principles through government. So, while 
conservatives may agree that gay marriage is banned by the dominant religion, perhaps 
even their own religion, they will seek reasons for legislating for or against it, that are 
different than a direct appeal to religious orthodoxy. 
One might expect a conservative to take a similar tack that Burke took with the 
oppression of Catholics. It might be true that a conservative’s religious faith says that gay 
marriage is wrong, but a conservative might see other benefits that could come about by 
allowing it. If (1) a conservative thought that we have had laws against gay marriage for 
some time and the laws still hadn’t prevented people from being gay (2) there might be 
some benefit gained by allowing gay marriage (monogamy, increased wealth, decreased 
social services, for example), and (3) the policy didn’t depart too far from the way things 
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have worked up until this point in time, then a conservative might be open to a policy 
change (though they certainly wouldn’t be obligated). 
As one can see, conservatism has a unique and flexible approach, and at no point 
does it declare that gay couples have a right to marry. Marriage is simply a privilege that can 
be granted or taken away based on the circumstances.  
If we shift to the liberal argument for gay marriage, we see a much different 
approach. Liberalism, or libertarianism, is rooted in freedom. Liberals argue that freedom 
dictates that every person has a right to make a contract and if two men or two women 
want to enter into a marriage contract then they shouldn’t be denied that right as long as it 
doesn’t infringe on anyone else’s rights. Usually understood as a form of J.S. Mill’s harm 
principle, if there isn’t direct harm to someone else involved, liberals believe people have a 
right to do as they wish.  
Conservatives, too, have a long history in the modern era of supporting contracts, 
but contracts are not viewed as a right. Enforcement of contracts by the government, 
conservatives would say, on the whole have been very useful at enlarging everyone’s 
independence over time, but some contracts are rightly forbidden, like, for example, selling 
votes or bodily organs, because contracts of this sort are believed to have detrimental 
effects on the people involved or the community as a whole. A judgment has to be made for 
conservatives about what the effects of allowing gay marriage will be. In essence, 
conservatives would not agree that citizens have contract rights that exist outside of 
civilization, only that consistently enforcing most contracts has usually produced good 
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results. So conservatives believe contracts should be promoted and protected by the 
government in most cases, but if there is some evidence that disallowing gay marriage 
contracts will have positive benefits, conservatives have no problem restricting those 
contracts the way liberals do. 
Perhaps the most popular argument for gay marriage comes from egalitarians, 
though. The egalitarian argument says that we must treat similarly situated people similarly, 
and that gay marriage is similar enough to traditional marriage to be treated the same. This 
public argument (and sometimes legal argument) often draws parallels between the similar 
treatment we give men and women even though they are not equal. This is occasionally a 
point of confusion among conservatives because sometimes conservatives concede that, 
yes, men and women should be treated the same under the law, sometimes even conceding 
the “right” of women to be treated equally.  
A conservative would never concede a right of equality for any group of people. 
Conservatives may admit, and even promote laws that protect access to schools and 
employment for certain groups, but the reason for that promotion is always because said 
laws would promote independence for the groups in question. So, for example, a 
conservative may approve of a law that grants access to women for law school admission 
because women ought to be able to get jobs as lawyers as means of supporting themselves 
and their families, if there are not negative consequences for doing so. That doesn’t mean 
that women are equal to men, or that admissions standards should be adopted to reflect 
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the percentage of women in the community (as egalitarian supporters of affirmative action 
might contend). 
Nevertheless, conservatism does have a limited component that can often be 
viewed as egalitarian. Conservatives believe that government is only justified if all its 
members are more independent than they otherwise would have been, and that every 
person has the ability to pass judgment on whether the government is doing an acceptable 
job or not. This is often viewed in terms that suggest humans are all equally capable of such 
activities. From the conservative view, though, basic political judgment is best viewed as a 
threshold that the vast majority of people have crossed rather than an equal position 
people are in. It is not that everyone is equally capable. They most certainly are not. It is just 
that, from the conservative point of view, the vast majority of people have crossed the 
minimum threshold required to make a very basic determination on whether the 
government is being run well or not. 
So, while all individuals are not equal in the eyes of conservatives, they all may be 
afforded the “equal right” to vote to remove officials from office, whether the voters are 
male, female, straight, gay, smart or dumb, because they all, by virtue of being human, have 
crossed the minimum threshold required to do so. But an appeal from gays that they should 
be treated equally, from a conservative point of view, makes no sense with regard to 
marriage, though it may make sense with regard to voting, or some other issue on which 
the fact they were gay wasn’t a distinguishing characteristic of the matter at hand. For 
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conservatives, gay marriage is substantively different than straight marriage. Though gay 
marriage may be allowed or not allowed, it isn’t equal. 
Conservatism is also sometimes confused with traditionalism. There are an infinite 
set of responses a traditionalist might have to gay marriage, I will discuss the one I judge to 
be the most important. The first traditionalist response to gay marriage might be something 
like: “Since the founding of this country marriage has only been recognized between a man 
and a woman and so we shouldn’t change this policy now because a handful of gay couples 
are inconvenienced by it.” In other words, there is an implied position that things are going 
well in the political community, and have been for a while, and we don’t want to screw 
things up by messing with something important like marriage.  
While it is true that conservatives, in practice, often adopt similar political positions 
as traditionalists, and indeed, generally oppose drastic departures from traditions which 
have generally produced good results and increased independence for the community, 
conservatives have done so for strictly consequentialist reasons. With regard to gay 
marriage, conservatives would be careful not to mess up a system of marriage that may 
have acted as the foundation of much of the independence our political community 
possesses.  
In practice conservatives and traditionalists may be brought close together if the 
debate is being held at the national level. A conservative would be far more likely to oppose 
a national level change, rather than change at the state level. It is perfectly consistent for a 
conservative to oppose recognition of gay marriage at the national level, and to be in favor 
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of it at the state level because the consequences are what matter to the conservative, and 
the conservative retains the power to change the law if there are discernible negative 
consequences. Conservatives are generally too modest to make a wide reaching change if a 
more narrow change can be made and then observed, first. So, at the national level in 
America, the correlation between conservative public policy and traditionalist public policy 
can be quite high. Nevertheless, the rationale behind the policies in question is quite 
different and should not be confused. 
Andrew Sullivan, a conservative who argues for a similar understanding of 
conservatism that this paper does, frames the conservative approach to gay marriage this 
way, “A conservative in government expects such changes in society as time goes by. His job 
is to accommodate them to existing institutions. He might come up with a solution like civil 
unions; or, worried that setting up a less demanding institution might undermine marriage, 
he might argue for co-opting gay couples into the existing social institution in one fell 
swoop. He might think it is wise to try this out in a few states first. But he will understand 
that some adjustment is necessary because the world changes, and the job of the 
conservative is to adjust to such changes as soberly and prudently as possible. 
“Notice what this isn’t. It’s not a declaration about the ultimate morality or 
otherwise of marriages for gay couples. That is left to the churches or synagogues or 
mosques or university seminars. It’s not an assertion that gay couples have a God-given or 
naturally required “right” to marry, as some liberals might argue.”35  
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Putting the example of gay marriage aside, it is also possible that there could be 
some confusion with regard to the difference between how a conservative treats 
independence, and how civic republicans and early liberals like Locke treated it. There are 
two key differences between conservatives and others with regard to their understandings 
of independence. The first is that the conservative understanding of independence is more 
expansive. All agree, for example, that not being subject to the arbitrary will of another is a 
form of independence. Or, perhaps more precisely, if one finds themselves subject to the 
arbitrary will of someone else, then they find themselves in a state of dependence. But 
conservatives place a much stronger emphasis on the avoidance of arbitrariness, rather 
than on the subjection to another’s will. For example, if history had shown that placing a 
large amount of power in the hands of a monarchy had served to reduce the amount of 
arbitrariness in a community, then a conservative may support monarchy in that particular 
case. I don’t think would be the case for civic republicans, or most liberals. 
The second difference is that conservatives not only consider domination by the 
arbitrariness of other people, but also of nature itself. Reducing the arbitrariness of nature 
can be just as important as ensuring that the base appetites and whims of an all-powerful 
ruler to not dominate the members of the political community. For this reason, 
conservatives may support a wide variety of public works projects if they, for example, 
provide a more stable food and water supply, or more dependable transportation, or they 
reduce disease. They may support insurance programs to help reduce the ill effects of bad 
luck, or economic schemes like central banks and property laws that have been shown to 
reduce aggregate arbitrariness or mitigate the effects of natural disasters. None of this 
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support is defended by way of a priori rights as a liberal might claim, or a specific political 
structure as the civic republican might claim, even if, simply by the way things turned out, 
conservatives generally think that property best operates very similar to the way a liberal 
would have it, and that monarchs and aristocracies are usually not the best way to reduce 
arbitrariness for the political community. 
So while early liberals and civic republicans and conservatives might all agree that 
being subject to the arbitrary will of another is bad, liberals would claim that it is bad 
because in the state of nature we were not subject to the arbitrary will of another. 
Conservatives would not say that. What they would say is that government is instituted in 
order to help reduce arbitrariness, especially the arbitrariness of nature, therefore, if 
whatever government we are a part of produces more arbitrariness, then what the 
government is doing is wrong because it goes against the very purpose of instituting 
government in the first place. Given the context of history, this aligns nicely with the view of 
civic republicans and non-domination; however, conservatism has a much more expansive 
view of independence and includes the reduction of both the arbitrariness of rulers and the 
arbitrariness of nature. One would probably not be out of line to consider conservatism an 
evolved form of civic republicanism, but it is essential that the recognition of non-
domination be extended to nature in the case of conservatism. 
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Distinction between Institutionalism 
Aside from religious orthodoxy, one of the most popular definitions of conservatism in 
the scholarly literature equates conservatism to institutionalism. The clearest and best case for 
this understanding was made by Samuel Huntington. Huntington’s argument is that 
conservatism is an ideology that tries to preserve existing political institutions, whatever they 
may be, and only accepts change if the change itself is made in order to preserve the existing 
institutions. In Huntington’s words “Thus, conservatism is that system of ideas employed to 
justify any established social order, no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental 
challenge to its nature or being, no matter from what quarter.”  And later, Huntington gives us 
the conditions under which conservatives may support change, “Indeed, in order to preserve 
the fundamental elements of society, it may be necessary to acquiesce in change on secondary 
issues.” And later, we also get, “A presumption exists “in favor of any settled scheme of 
government against any untried project…[Burke quote]” Man’s hopes are high, but his vision is 
short. Efforts to remedy existing evils usually result in even greater ones.”36 
Before I address Huntington’s institutionalist definition, I must diverge for a moment 
and unpack some of Burke’s understandings of other words like liberty, happiness, and utility. 
Happiness, in the sense Burke uses it, shouldn’t be thought of in terms of Benthamite pleasure. 
No Burkean scholar I have read understands it this way. The best way to interpret happiness is 
similar to Aristotle’s understanding of a flourishing life. So in Burke’s view, government should 
aim to promote flourishing lives for its citizens. Utility also should not be mistaken for 
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utilitarianism. Instead, what Burke means is simply that government should do what works. 
Simply aiming to promote flourishing lives is not enough to fulfill the government’s mandate; it 
must also establish institutions and policies that actually produce more flourishing lives than 
there otherwise would have been without such institutions and policies.  
Theoretically, liberty was the value that Englishmen cherished which led them to live 
flourishing lives. And the tangible thing that Englishmen used to measure their liberty was 
usually money. “Liberty inheres in some sensible object; and every nation has formed to itself 
some favorite point, which by way of eminence becomes the criterion of their happiness.” “It 
happened, you know, Sir, that the great contests for freedom in this country were from the 
earliest times chiefly upon the question of taxing. Most of the contests in the ancient 
commonwealths turned primarily on the election of magistrates, or on the balance among the 
several orders of the state. The question of money was not with them so immediate. But in 
England it was otherwise.”37 While Burke roots his value of money in the conventions of the 
English people and not theory, the result is exactly what we would expect from a conservative 
who recognizes the fact that money holds the potential to make independence more durable, 
and as a consequence, make life better for the public. In this sense, Burkean liberty becomes 
synonymous with durable independence. They both require institutions, money, and a value of 
social continuity in order to ultimately make a better political community over the long run.38 
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With Burke’s understanding of liberty more firmly established, let’s examine the 
problem with Huntington’s definition of conservatism as a form of institutionalism. An 
institutionalist conservative must always try to preserve the current institutional arrangement 
unless the institution itself will otherwise collapse. In the case of Burke, if we adopt the 
institutionalist explanation of conservatism, we would expect Burke to only accept major 
changes to the British constitution if the system itself was fundamentally threatened, yet Burke 
suggested that the constitution be altered in order to accommodate the demands of American 
colonists for representation. Consider this quote with regard to the American colonists, and 
whether it has at its core the ideals of an institutionalist, “Our late experience has taught us 
that many of those fundamental principles formerly believed infallible are either not of the 
importance they were imagined to be, or that we have not at all adverted to some other far 
more important and far more powerful principles which entirely overrule those we had 
considered as omnipotent.” Burke continues a bit later and appeals to the loss of freedom 
[independence] at home “To prove that the Americans ought not to be free [independent], we 
are obliged to depreciate the value of freedom [independence] itself…”39 In one sense, this is a 
vague reference to freedom, in another it is a direct appeal to the value of money. In either 
case, Burke has shown the value of both freedom and money to be related to durable 
independence. This is an appeal to independence, not to any particular British institution. In 
fact, Burke goes on to propose a major change to the British constitution so that Americans can 
be allowed representation, and while Burke cites precedent for expanding representation with 
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examples from the past in which representation was expanded for other groups, the alteration 
of the constitution still must be recognized as a major institutional change.  
The reasons Burke gives for change are not that British institutions are threatened by 
America, but instead that the value of English freedom is threatened by the suppression of 
American freedom. It is also important to point out that Burke valued British institutions, not 
for their own sake, but because he thought that those institutions benefitted the material well-
being of those being governed. “When I first came into a public trust, I found your Parliament in 
possession of an unlimited legislative power over the colonies… I had, indeed, very earnest 
wishes to keep the whole body of this authority perfect and entire as I found it—and to keep it 
so, not for our advantage solely, but principally for the sake of those on whose account all just 
authority exists: I mean the people to be governed.”40  
It should be noted that Huntington’s observation is not entirely without merit. Burke 
does indeed suggest that the unwise use of power can undermine the very institution that is in 
possession of that power. But what Burke is pointing out when he says: “But it is not the 
propriety of the exercise which is in question. The exercise itself is wisely forborne. Its repose 
may be the preservation of its existence; and its existence may be the means of saving the 
constitution itself, on an occasion worthy of bringing it forth…”41 is that Parliament must not 
exercise every power it possesses in every case which comes before it because that use may be 
a cause for the power to be lost. But that the power may be retained because Parliament may 
someday be able to use that power to save the constitution itself, which is an example of 
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exercising the power in a way that would be a worthy cause. Burke simply assumes that 
everyone recognizes the value of the “constitution itself”, but it could have just as easily been 
some other cause, and not just a case of institutional salvation. Burke goes on to give the 
“Convocation of the Clergy” example, in which their practical power was taken away, but their 
constitutional authority was not. Burke says that the power “may be called out to act and 
energy whenever there is occasion”42 (emphasis mine).  
On Huntington’s view, they should only be able to “be called out to act” if some 
institution is being fundamentally threatened, not “whenever there is occasion”. Huntington 
rightly recognizes the preservation aspect of Burke’s thought, but doesn’t recognize that the 
reason for the preservation is so that the power can be available for use on a more worthy 
cause…any worthy cause. 
This paper takes the view that it is no coincidence that Burke thinks the American 
demand for more expansive independence via representation in government and control over 
American taxation policy is part of a consistent pattern of behavior by Burke in which he 
chooses durable independence as his paramount value. Burke’s general accommodation of 
American demands ultimately was made because Burke thought Americans capable of more 
independence from Britain, and that Britain and America would both monetarily benefit from 
the accommodation. On these accounts, Burke was consistent throughout the American 
confrontation. It is much less clear that from the beginning, British institutions were 
fundamentally threatened by America as Huntington would suggest. Yet, from the beginning, 
Burke argued for accommodation, and eventually argued for fundamental institutional change 
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by altering the British constitution. We would not expect this behavior if we adopted 
Huntington’s definition. 
It is true that in Reflections… Burke states, “A state without the means of some change is 
without the means of conservation. Without such means it might even risk the loss of that part 
of the constitution which it wished the most religiously to preserve.”43 In this sense, Huntington 
is correct to state that Burke appears to accept institutional change as a means to preserve the 
institution itself. But there is a deeper question to ask, and that is why this preservation is 
important? Burke provides an answer to that a few lines later “No experience has taught us 
that in any other course or method than that of a hereditary crown our liberties [independence] 
can be regularly perpetuated and preserved [durability] sacred as our hereditary right.”44 Once 
again, the reason for conserving as much of the current institution as possible, even in times of 
change, is ultimately for the sake of a durable independence.  
Burke’s real argument with regard to the French Revolution is that it had ultimately 
produced the very opposite of independence for its people. The French Revolution produced 
popular arbitrary power, and the arbitrary power of a mass of people is just as bad as the 
arbitrariness of nature; the very thing that government is instituted in order to reduce. For 
Burke, the right we gain in a civil state is independence, or reduced arbitrariness. What we find 
in the state of nature are an infinite set of encounters with arbitrariness, whether it be from 
nature or our fellow men, governed by passions instead of wisdom. In Burke’s words “Men 
cannot enjoy the rights of an uncivil and of a civil state together. That he may obtain justice, he 
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gives up his right of determining what it is in points the most essential to him. That he may 
secure some liberty [independence], he makes a surrender in trust of the whole of it 
[independence].”45 In short, what the French did was fail to realize that we must give up our 
individual short-term independence in order to perpetually secure our long-term independence 
and make our lives less subject to the arbitrariness of both nature and the passions of man. In 
doing so, by completely changing every institution of government, the French effectively made 
themselves more subject to arbitrariness. Burke suggests that they shouldn’t have made such 
wholesale changes, not because there was something inherently good about the previous 
institutions, he says “…they never ought to have submitted, to the arbitrary pleasure of one 
man; but, under circumstances in which the arbitrary pleasure of many persons in the 
community pressed with an intolerable hardship upon the just and equal rights of their fellows, 
such a choice might be made, as among evils.”46 Burke suggests that the lesser evil in terms of 
arbitrariness was the established institution, but it is entirely based on the outcome, not on any 
inherent value of the institution itself. If Burke thinks France’s monarchal structure should have 
stayed, it was purely in an effort to reduce the arbitrariness of the available alternative 
structures and in effect maintain the relative independence the French people still had, even 
under the monarchy.  
Conservatism then requires changes to institutions when the results are expected to 
produce a more long-term, or durable, independence for citizens. Since institutions are 
assumed to be the embodiments of time-tested wisdom, in practice these changes are only 
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made when there is significant pressure being placed on the institution in question. For this 
reason, there is a high correlation between institutional pressure and institutional change. But 
what makes conservatism unique from institutionalism is that change, and the degree of 
change, will always be justified by aiming to produce (or recover) a more durable independence 
for citizens, and not to save institutions for their own sake. 
 
Distinction between Aristocracy 
Not all detractors of conservatism think that conservatism is either incoherent or 
explained by something other than durable independence. Karl Mannheim claims that 
conservatives are the result of background socio-economic conditions and best understood as 
representatives, or spokespeople, for the ruling class47, and that Burkean conservatism was 
mostly a reaction to the French Revolution in an effort to prevent the same sort of revolution 
from happening to the ruling class in England. In this sense, though Burke wasn’t part of the 
aristocracy himself, he was representing their interests by opposing radical change in an 
attempt to be rewarded by entrance into the ruling class. For Mannheim, class conflict defines 
modern conservatism.  
Analyzing Manheim’s claim will require an examination of the history and conditions in 
England leading up to Burke’s era. There are three potential claims that someone who has 
adopted Manheim’s explanation could make with regard to Burke. This is due to the fact that 
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an argument could be made from the perspective of any one of three ruling classes in England 
at the time: the Court, the Aristocracy, or the Oligarchy. The first potential claim was that Burke 
was a spokesperson for the Crown, and that his actions could be explained by determining what 
was in the interest of the Crown. Nobody, however, supports this claim. The Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, which Burke defended, was, in almost every interpretation, one in which 
the Crown’s interests were over-ruled by Parliament or an outside force. In addition to this, 
Burke spoke out aggressively against the interference of the King George III in the affairs of 
Parliament.48 So the first potential claim that Burke was a spokesperson for King George III, and 
that Burke’s political thoughts and actions can be understood by understanding what would 
benefit the King, can be dismissed fairly quickly. 
This leaves two potential claims remaining. One is that Burke was a spokesperson for 
the aristocracy and that his thoughts and actions can be explained by looking at what the 
aristocracy required. It isn’t clear, however, that Burke’s support for more liberal economics 
was in line with the aristocracy in England at the time. Huntington framed the response to 
Mannheim nicely: “By 1790, when according to the aristocratic theory of conservatism [i.e. 
Mannheim] Burke was defending the feudal corporate order, the Industrial Revolution in 
England was already a generation old. Was Burke repelled by the growth of commerce and 
industry? Did he seek to return to the feudal agrarian order of a previous age? Far from it. For 
Burke, as Namier declares, “trade was the soul of the empire.” As early as 1770 Burke stated his 
position in no uncertain terms: “There is no such thing as the landed interest separate from the 
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trading interest…Turn your land into trade.” Is this the advice of a feudal apologist?”49 
Additionally, Burke often didn’t have kind words for aristocracy. I will take Burke’s word that he 
himself was “no friend of aristocracy” and that if the constitution had to be changed, Burke 
preferred to see it “resolved into any other form, than lost in that austere and insolent 
domination.”50 
Though Burke was no feudal apologist and was born of middle rank, it is not unthinkable 
that Burke may be thought of as part of the ruling class, or as someone trying to gain access to 
that class via the wealth accumulation made possible in a society that embraces liberal 
economic policies and institutions. A Mannheim supporter might make the case that liberal 
changes in England had already been made as far back as 1688, or farther, and that Burke’s 
support of oligarchy as part of the ruling class explains his modern conservative views.  
 
Distinction between Oligarchy 
 Although Burke supported the general governmental structure that contained all three 
ruling classes—the crown, the aristocracy, and the oligarchy—it is difficult to find occasions 
when Burke expressly went against what one could consider oligarchic interests (meaning, 
interests that went against those with movable property that wasn’t attached to an estate). At 
best, there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding whether or not the interests of oligarchs 
explain Burke’s positions. With regard to Burke’s proposed conciliation with America, much of 
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what he argued was that England would be much wealthier if it did not enter a military conflict 
with such a prosperous colony; a situation where even if England were victorious, much of the 
wealth in America may be destroyed in the process. On one hand, wealth is proxy for 
independence, as I have noted earlier. On the other, it was certainly in the interest of oligarchic 
powers in England, whose primary interest is making money, that the wealth generating 
potential of the American colonies be maximized to the oligarchs’ benefit. One could 
legitimately make the case that England would grow wealthier by not pushing the Americans 
into rebellion, and in this case it isn’t clear which of these reasons motivated Burke. 
The clearest case of Burke acting against oligarchic interests is probably the 
impeachment trial of Warren Hastings. Hastings had been accused of perpetrating inhumanities 
against the Indian people and Burke sought to have him impeached for it. In doing so Burke 
describes in a disapproving way of the mixing of mercantilism with imperialism which was the 
character of the East India Company.51 Lord Macaulay described the system thusly: “On the one 
side was a band of English functionaries, daring, intelligent, helpless, timid, accustomed to 
crouch under oppression…The business of a servant of the company was simply to wring out of 
the natives a hundred or two hundred thousand pounds as speedily as possible, that he might 
return home before his constitution had suffered from the heat, to marry a peer’s daughter, to 
buy rotten boroughs in Cornwall, and give balls in St. James’s Square.”52 
Burke’s speaking out against such practices, at least on its face, doesn’t seem to be 
easily explained by oligarchic interests. Presumably, extracting money and resources from India 
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would be exactly the sort of thing that we would expect Burke to support if his motives were 
oligarchic. However, if one views this dispute as an internal struggle within the oligarchy, and 
that the monopoly the East India Company maintained had long been a frustration to the Whigs 
of which Burke was a member53, it may have been that the East India Company was viewed as 
taking money out of India that rightly belonged to the Parliament or some other set of 
merchants, and that the East India Company had instead been placing the extracted wealth in 
others’ hands. There remains quite a lot of ambiguity. It is not impossible to explain Burke’s 
thoughts and actions by aligning them with oligarchic interests, but neither is it clear that Burke 
wasn’t genuinely speaking out against oppression of the Indian people as he had previously 
done for Catholics in Ireland.  
The strongest case that can be made for Burke the oligarch is with regard to his position 
on government food aid for the needy. Food is an essential element of independence so one 
would expect that if Burke sought to promote durable independence then he would support 
food aid. Historically, however, conservatives, including Burke, have been reluctant to support 
state-sponsored food aid. Instead they have usually promoted private associations as the 
mechanism for providing necessities for citizens. Burke does the same: 
 “This example of Rome, which has been derived from the most ancient times, and the 
most flourishing period of the Roman Empire, (but not of the Roman agriculture,) may serve as 
a great caution to all governments not to attempt to feed the people out of the hands of the 
magistrates. If once they are habituated to it, though but for one half-year, they will never be 
satisfied to have it otherwise. And having looked to government for bread, on the very first 
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scarcity they will turn and bite the hand that fed them. To avoid that evil, government will 
redouble the causes of it; and then it will become inveterate and incurable. 
“I beseech the government (which I take in the largest sense of the word, 
comprehending the two Houses of Parliament) seriously to consider that years of scarcity or 
plenty do not come alternately or at short intervals, but in pretty long cycles and irregularly, 
and consequently that we cannot assure ourselves, if we take a wrong measure, from the 
temporary necessities of one season, but that the next, and probably more, will drive us to the 
continuance of it; so that, in my opinion, there is no way of preventing this evil, which goes to 
the destruction of all our internal commerce which touches or agriculture the most nearly, as 
well as the safety and very being of government, but manfully to resist the very first idea, 
speculative or practical, that it is within the competence of government, taken as government, 
or even the rich, as rich, to supply to the poor those necessaries which it has pleased the Divine 
Providence for a while to withhold from them. We, the people, ought to be made sensible that 
it is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of Nature, and consequently the 
laws of God, that we are to place our hope of softening the Divine displeasure to remove any 
calamity under which we suffer or which hangs over us.”54 
If one combines Burke’s reasoning in the quote above with his other writings on the 
subject, his essential reasoning on the topic of providing food aid went thusly: (1) The state’s 
resources come from the citizens, not the other way around, and the wealthy do not have 
enough to provide for the poor because the wealthy are dependent on the poor (2) If the state 
did attempt to provide aid by storing grain, it would be prohibitively expensive (3) The state 
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would encourage dependency by the poor that could eventually threaten the viability of the 
government, threaten peace, and threaten civility (4) The reason the poor cannot sometimes 
afford food is because they are too numerous and their labor is a commodity that fluctuates 
with population size. 55 
In terms of Burkean arguments, this isn’t his best. Firstly, he seeks to address the 
relationship between the needy and the wealthy while simultaneously addressing the 
relationship between the state and the needy, yet it isn’t clear that the wealthy and the state 
are necessarily the same people. Only if the proposal is for the state to take exclusively from 
the wealthy and give to the needy does Burke’s argument make sense because (1) According to 
Burke, the rich are dependent on the poor and certainly do not have enough to provide for 
them56, and (2) Burke suggests that the poor could become dependent on the state (as many in 
Roman times did), yet (3) The state during Roman times presumably acquired the grain for food 
aid from someplace, with funds from someone, and if it didn’t come from the wealthy or the 
poor, it must have come from those in the middle. So, it seems possible that the state could 
provide aid to the needy, but just that the funds could not come exclusively from the rich 
because the rich alone did not have enough to feed the poor. Additionally, in times of scarcity, 
if the rich really were fully dependent on the poor, it would be they who had to go to the poor 
in search of food, not the other way around. While Burke makes a valid point that the rich may 
not have enough to support the poor, he over simplifies their dependence on them. The key 
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difference between the two is that during times of scarcity the rich have enough money to buy 
food on the market while the poor do not. Burke doesn’t usually make such poor arguments. 
And it raises the question of whether it was because he was committed to the oligarchy, and 
feeding the poor was simply not in their interest?  
It is likely not the case that there was physically not enough food to feed everyone, but 
instead the case that some people did not possess enough money to buy food. If this were not 
the case, then the wealthy would be in no better position than the poor and money would be 
useless. Due to the fact that while food wasn’t plentiful, and was expensive, and the fact that it 
might have been the case the government could not economically store food for times when 
food was expensive in order to feed the poor, that doesn’t mean the government couldn’t have 
stored money for times when food was expensive, and have purchased food for the poor in 
times of need. Again, for someone with the intellectual powers of Burke, recognizing that only 
poor people were in need of food seems like something he should have noticed. The case for 
Burke the oligarch gains strength on this point. 
If we were only left with Burke’s reasons examined so far for denying food aid, it would 
be difficult to argue against those who claim that the actions of conservatives can be explained 
by whatever happens to be in the interest of the oligarchic powers that be. However, Burke’s 
other reason for denying food aid still remains, and it is more consistent with durable 
independence and also more consistent with reasons that have historically been given by other 
conservatives, and are still often given by conservatives today. Burke’s other reason for denial is 
his worry that the recipients of food aid will become permanently dependent on the aid. While 
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this reason is not necessarily linked to the oligarchy, this issue causes problems for 
conservatism because life is the fundamental example of independence that conservatives 
value so much. In short, saving a life should garner one of the highest priorities for 
conservatives. However, a life lived in total dependence on another, like slavery, or serfdom, or 
a long-term welfare recipient, is also the worst kind of life. And if it persists for generation after 
generation, it becomes even worse.  
While relying on avoiding dependence to explain withholding food aid may distinguish 
conservatism from oligarchy which seeks to hoard its wealth, it creates a paradox within 
conservatism that if not solved, may cause conservatism to be indistinguishable in practice from 
oligarchy. In other words, conservatism needs to figure out a way to both allow markets to exist 
because of money’s potential to increase independence, yet find a way to help people with 
necessities (both because of lack of money and because of true scarcity), all while preventing 
people from becoming unnecessarily dependent on the aid. If conservatism can do this, it will 
successfully distinguish itself from oligarchy in a practical sense while allowing that markets can 
be a valuable tool for increasing independence. If conservatism fails to find a solution, then it 
must either refuse aid and become potentially indistinguishable in practice from oligarchy on 
this issue, or provide aid and potentially undermine the independence it claims to support and 
threaten the internal consistency of the ideology itself. 
The ideal solution, then, for conservatives is one that provides immediate aid when it is 
needed, but quickly takes steps to alleviate the necessity. If conservatism fails to find a way to 
do this, then it can become confused in practice with oligarchy, and its central value of 
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maximizing money for those in charge. It is at this crucial point conservatives, including Burke, 
often make an error in judgment. That error consists in constructing a potential false dichotomy 
between the national government and the free market, and then arguing that the danger of 
dependency with regard to the national government solution is too great, and that the only 
other option is the market and private help, or, perhaps, Divine Grace. 
Burke implies that laws of commerce are so strong as to be Divine in nature. It may be 
true that the most basic laws of supply and demand are that strong. For example, in times of 
true scarcity of a necessity, the value of that necessity will rise. In this very basic sense, I agree 
with Burke. However, it isn’t so clear that institutions like the Bank of England and the East 
India Company, and all the capitalistic functions they perform, are divinely ordained by nature. 
As I mentioned earlier, the problem Burke is attempting to address seems less like a genuine 
scarcity issue, and more like one of high market prices. Ironically, the very market institutions 
supported by the national government rather than the laws of nature, can sometimes cause the 
high market prices for necessities. 
In Burke’s defense, up until this period of time, the market was successful at providing 
not only increased access to necessities, but also a wide variety of other desirable products and 
innovations. Indeed, it may have looked as if supply and demand supported by government 
enforced contracts was always the best route to take when compared with state regulations of 
goods. However, as we will see, the market is far from perfect. 
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In Sven Beckert’s book Empire of Cotton which documents the history of the global 
cotton industry, we find an illuminating glimpse at some of the problems state-supported 
global markets can cause.57 
For centuries in India, farmers had grown both cotton and subsistence crops side by 
side. They consumed the subsistence crops, a portion of the cotton they spun and wove for 
personal use, and surplus cotton they sold to the marketplace, which often made its way to the 
world market. The Indians continued to live very traditional lives throughout most of the 
interior India even as industrialization gripped much of the rest of the world. British 
industrialists had a very difficult time penetrating the interior of India and industrializing the 
cotton industry. 
During the American Civil War, cotton production dropped and the price of cotton rose. 
The scarcity of cotton on the market incentivized the British to alter property laws and contract 
laws in India so that more cotton could be produced more productively in the Indian interior. 
The changes in laws (demanded by capitalists in Britain) pushed Indian producers to 
industrialize and switch from their traditional ways of doing things (ways which incorporated 
long-standing social traditions and relationships) to a cotton monoculture more heavily 
influenced by contracts. 
Under this system, farmers planted and produced cotton; they sold the cotton on the 
world market, and took the money from those sales to buy necessities (much like most of our 
industrial farmers today). Unfortunately, after the Civil War was over, there were periods of 
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falling cotton prices, and during some of those times many millions of people in India starved to 
death. They didn’t starve to death because of droughts or floods or blights. There was actually 
not a shortage of food. They starved because the low price of cotton did not provide them with 
enough money to buy food.58 
This situation shows how it was likely not Divine Providence that caused a lack of food. 
And it was not basic market activity. Basic market activity had provided a useful outlet for 
excess cotton products for centuries. The cause was placing the irrational and arbitrary demand 
from strangers who lived on the other side of the world above the long-standing traditions 
which had produced a large amount of relative security and independence for the inhabitants 
of India’s interior.  
It is worth noting that the state was highly involved in this transformation. Laws were 
changed so as to make it nearly impossible to do business in the traditional way; in an effort to 
accommodate the markets, large infrastructure projects were constructed that altered 
traditional markets. This makes it difficult for conservatives to draw a distinction between the 
“market” and the “state”. But most importantly, we must recognize that while the market can 
produce more independence for people, it can also produce dependence. Where over the long 
term the market can produce an increased amount of independence in the aggregate, it can be 
wildly irrational along the way. Ultimately, the market is not as perfect in practice as Burke 
thought it was, nor is it as independent from state influence. World markets of this sort are 
almost entirely dependent on state support. As the world industrialized, this becomes clearer 
and clearer to the conservatives who came after Burke. 
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Booker T. Washington is a good example of a conservative who understood the 
importance of not subjecting necessities to the whims of the global market.59 When he agreed 
to send advisers to Togo to help develop the cotton industry for the natives there, Washington 
insisted that “I should very much hope that your Company will not make the same mistake that 
has been made in the South among our people, that is, teach them to raise nothing but cotton. 
I find that they make much better progress financially and otherwise where they are taught to 
raise something to eat at the same time they are raising cotton.”60 
Washington had corrected for Burke’s error in judgment about the market. He had 
judged first-hand that the market could not be counted on to provide for necessities in a 
consistent manor, even though Washington placed a large emphasis on teaching the vocational 
skills demanded by the market.61 Washington, perhaps more than any other modern 
conservative, valued both the independence the market could provide, while also recognizing 
that when it comes to necessities, the market tends not to make important value distinctions 
between luxuries and necessities, and that one would be wise not to depend on the market for 
necessities. 
In essence, the laws of commerce, especially when artificially implemented by the state 
in direct opposition to local traditions are not immutable from a conservative point of view 
even if markets are highly valued by their utility. The tendency for markets to create 
dependency as industrialism progressed was only just beginning in Burke’s time, but later 
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conservatives would become acutely aware of the danger and increasingly there emerged a 
sharp division between conservatism, and both liberalism and oligarchy.62 During Burke’s time 
in the mid-18th century, this was beginning to develop, but it had not become nearly so clear as 
it had by Booker T. Washington’s time.  
In modern times, as I shall argue later in the paper, there have been some issues that 
more clearly distinguish the conservative view from the oligarchic, and so while at this point 
there may still be some ambiguity with regard to what explains Burke’s actions, there has been 
nothing that repudiates the idea that he was primarily promoting durable independence, even 
if many of those actions could have conceivably been explained by oligarchic interests. When 
we look at the conservatives of the past twenty years in America, there will be a clearer split. 
 If we view oligarchs as those who value money above all else and who also limit power 
to those with the most money, then there is a second oligarchic practice one might accuse 
Burke of as well: restricting political participation. 
Conservatism sprung into history as a result of debates about representation and 
independence. In fact, the emergence of the word independence, or independency, can be 
traced back to the time leading up the English Civil War.63 The rise of this value of 
independence came with the rise of the of the “Country” ideology in England. Groups of several 
dozen families in each county in England had grown in both responsibility and wealth in the 
early part of the 17th century, “At first their prime loyalty was to their local patron, their “good 
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Lord”, but as time went by they became more and more independent and began to act as 
leaders and Representatives of their local community, their “Country” as they called it. By 1621 
those who were not offered positions by the central government began to assume a new role 
as the defenders of an ideology, the “Country,” the antithetical opposite to what they had 
come to regard as a wicked, corrupt, extravagant, and ever-encroaching “Court”. Since they 
dominated the House of Commons as well as the counties, somehow or other their view and 
interests needed to be accommodated within the normal give-and-take of political life.”64  
It took several decades for the ideology to fully form, but once it was fully formed 
Professor Pocock described it thusly: “Society is made up of a Court and a Country; government 
of Court and Parliament; Parliament of Court and Country members. The Court is the 
administration. The Country consists of men of property; all others are servants. The business 
of Parliament is to preserve the independence of property, on which is founded all human 
liberty and all human excellence. The business of government is to wield power, and power has 
a natural tendency to encroach. It is more important to supervise government than to support 
it because the preservation of independence is the ultimate political good.”65 If this seems 
remarkably similar to what I have described as conservatism, it is.66 The key difficulty for this 
view lay with finding a way to maximize independence as measured by property (both landed 
and movable) without subjecting the public good solely to the interests of oligarchy, which, may 
have interests that are not always aligned with the public good. In other words, there can be 
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tension between those people whose primary qualification for office is property, and with the 
public good. Lawrence Stone quotes Charles James Fox in 1797 with regard to Fox’s view of the 
best system of representation. “The most perfect system,” he said, is one “which shall include 
the greatest number of independent electors and exclude the greatest number of those who 
are necessarily by their condition dependent.”67  
This line of thinking dominated America during the early republic as well. America did 
away with hereditary aristocracy and the king, but kept in place the conservative idea that 
independence was a prerequisite for political participation, hence the limiting of political 
participation to white men of property. Early republican conservatives thought that citizens 
required a certain amount of personal independence so that they would not be easily 
influenced by the will of others while electing people to, or standing for, public office. So, a wife 
may be subject to will of her husband and so she was excluded, a wage laborer or apprentice 
may be subject to the will of their boss so they were excluded, a slave was subject to the will of 
their master and so they were excluded. Those people left were those with enough property to 
afford the leisure required to participate in politics on an equal level with others who were 
similarly situated.68  
Ultimately, the configuration was, if we are being generous, designed to place people in 
office who were deemed wise and virtuous by those who could judge independently. And when 
the office-holder took office, they would also necessarily possess the requisite power, so as to 
not be unduly influenced by forces beyond those they were obliged to represent. What this 
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system always neglected was that these so-called independent, propertied men, had always 
been dependent on those whom they excluded from participation. They had always been 
dependent on their wives, their servants, their employees, their slaves, and their newly arrived 
immigrants. Admirably, Burke recognized this dependence. Less admirably he either never fully 
accepted or understood what it required, or he did not think it wise to depart from the English 
status quo, because in doing so, the balance of power in the English Parliament may have 
shifted to the King and his patrons, rather than to the people. Either way, it isn’t clear that 
oligarchic interests are the reason people were excluded from participation and not reasons of 
independence. 
At any rate, with the exception of felons and illegal immigrants, few conservatives in 
America today actively promote the disenfranchisement of large groups of people, and this 
paper will address the immigration issue in the second and third sections, where it will show 
that from an oligarchic viewpoint, immigration, legal or illegal, is actually desirable, yet from a 
conservative view, large amounts of immigration may be undesirable for reasons of 
independence. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
CONSERVATISM AS A LIVING TRADITION 
 
Thus far, this paper has argued that durable independence is the primary value that 
defines conservatism as it was practiced by the conservative archetype Edmond Burke. The 
objection might be made, however, that the method used of examining how conservatism has 
traditionally and historically been articulated and practiced is incomplete or inappropriate. 
Instead, some may argue, the more relevant question is how conservatism is being practiced in 
America today and what value or values it is now promoting, because it is possible that what 
conservatism promoted during the time of Edmond Burke is no longer practiced in American 
politics. In response to this objection, this part of the paper shall argue that even if we examine 
conservatism in America over the course of the past twenty years we will find that durable 
independence is likely the primary value of most of the conservative electorate (even if it is not 
always carried out in practice by politicians). The paper will focus on four issues that directly 
relate to durable independence: avoidance of corporate and social welfare dependence, 
reduction of federal deficits, avoidance of military intervention unless independence is 
threatened, and preservation of cultural traditions, including religious traditions, unless they 
come into conflict with independence. Rhetorically, and sometimes politically, most or all of 
these independence-related issues have been supported by conservatives in recent years.  
There is a strong claim and a weak claim that can potentially be made about the primary 
value of conservatives in America today. The strong claim is that there is abundant empirical 
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evidence provided by the research of political scientists that have operationalized, compared, 
measured and analyzed those actions and sentiments among both politicians and citizens which 
show evidence that there is a strong presence of and correlation with the value of durable 
independence. This paper shall not defend the strong claim for two reasons. The first reason is 
simply the time constraint placed on a Master Thesis deadline. The second reason is that since 
this interpretation of conservatism isn’t widely held among political scientists, it is likely that 
they haven’t attempted to measure the sorts of sentiments and actions required to defend the 
stronger claim adequately. 
For these reasons, this paper shall make a weaker claim. It will argue that there are 
plausible reasons for thinking that the value of durable independence might better explain the 
existence of the modern conservative movement since 1994 than the existing alternative 
explanations. In addition to this claim, the paper will also argue that there are plausible reasons 
for thinking that conservatism’s popularity is linked to how well politicians promote the value of 
durable independence both rhetorically and in action. 
It is highly likely that conservatism and the value of durable independence are still alive 
in American politics today. There have been two conservative movements in the past twenty 
years in America. The first began in 1994 and was spearheaded by the “Contract with America” 
and ended in 2001. The second coalesced as a positive movement in conjunction with what has 
broadly been defined as the Tea Party movement in 2009, and still exists in the spring of 2015.69 
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Let’s first begin with the 1995 cohort of Republican congressmen and three of the four 
issues this paper has chosen to focus on: welfare, federal deficits, and avoiding unnecessary 
military intervention.  Unnecessary military interventions might be considered conservative 
because they are a sign that the country does not possess the resources to maintain its self-
sufficiency, or that the cost of blood and treasure (both independence proxies) are only worth 
the cost if our independence is at stake.  
While one might accurately describe the Presidencies of George H. W. Bush and Ronald 
Reagan as interventionist (the Persian Gulf War and Panama in the case of Bush and a series of 
proxy wars against the Soviets under Reagan)70, the Republican congress from 1995 to 2001 
was remarkably anti-interventionist. Most potential interventions, for better or for worse, were 
avoided entirely.71 But the one major intervention that did occur during this time was the NATO 
intervention in Serbia and Kosovo. The reason it was a NATO intervention and not a U.S. 
intervention was because 187 Republicans in the House of Representatives voted against the 
war resolution.72 Additionally, during this period, a no-fly zone was enforced in Iraq along with 
economic sanctions with little or no escalation in violence or military intervention. It wasn’t the 
case that this was the result of simple party politics. Some Republicans, including future 
President G.W. Bush, supported Clinton’s Serbia intervention.73 While one could claim that this 
period between the Cold War and the War on Terror was simply a quiet period with regard to 
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violence, that wouldn’t explain the avoidance by such large numbers of Republicans with regard 
to Serbia. What the period more likely points to is that when there isn’t a credible threat to 
independence (in the eyes of conservatives), like Soviet expansion or terrorism on American 
soil, then we expect conservatives to be non-interventionist.74 
Next let’s examine efforts to reduce the federal deficit during this period. The reason 
limiting federal debt is consistent with valuing independence is two-fold. The first reason is that 
all debt is a type of dependence. Taking on debt is the equivalent of saying “I cannot afford this 
without the help of another.” This doesn’t mean that all debt is bad in the long run. If debt is 
taken on, and an investment ultimately produces more independence than one otherwise 
would have had, then it may be better to take on debt sometimes. For example, if someone 
found employment in a nearby town, but did not own a car, it may be a good investment for 
them to take a loan out for a car if the long-term benefits of the job exceed the cost of the car. 
But in general, a large amount of debt is undesirable from a conservative point of view. 
Additionally, if a significant portion of the national debt is owed to foreign countries, then it 
potentially threatens America’s independence with regard to foreign policy and international 
relations. 
The second reason for limiting federal spending is that both egalitarianism and oligarchy 
require large amounts of federal intervention to either distribute money to citizens or to 
subsidize big business. If spending is kept relatively low at the federal level, then it becomes 
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much more difficult for egalitarians and oligarchs to exercise power and create patronage 
relationships based on dependency. For these reasons, it is logical for conservatives to be 
concerned about both the level of federal spending and the national debt. 
The first plank of the 1994 “Contract with America” was support for a Balanced Budget 
Amendment (BBA). The Balanced Budget Amendment passed the House with overwhelming 
Republican support, but failed in the Senate in 1997 by a single vote, garnering 66 Senate 
votes.75 This is further evidence that conservatism was alive and well in recent history. And 
even though the Balanced Budget Amendment did not pass, the federal budget during this 
period was balanced, or nearly balanced most of the time, lending evidence to the thesis that 
the BBA was not just political maneuvering, but a real effort made on the part of the 
Republicans elected in 1994 to balance the federal budget. 
If conservatives were moderately successful in avoiding unnecessary military 
intervention in the years 1995-2000, and also moderately successful at balancing the federal 
budget, they were extremely successful at attempting to reduce government welfare 
dependence. The “Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act” of 1996 provides, at the 
national level, an example of a conservative approach to welfare reform. The act was passed by 
a Republican controlled Congress led by Newt Gingrich and signed into law by Democratic 
President Bill Clinton. Without going into the bill specifics, what follows will focus on the 
general intent of the legislation. 
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Welfare rolls had risen dramatically from the time welfare was introduced in the 1930s 
until the time of the reform in 1996. Women and children who had been disabled or widowed 
had been the original group targeted by welfare programs. Essentially, the goal was to provide 
for people who would have been in a true, and relatively permanent, state of dependency 
anyway, and to prevent them from becoming entirely destitute. Increasingly, however, with 
rising divorce rates and absentee fathers, many more single mothers were added to the welfare 
rolls. These were, in the eyes of the public at least, people who were not permanently disabled 
facing near-certain destitution, but people who hadn’t experienced any other form of life 
except one entirely dependent on government assistance.76  
Welfare of this sort, viewed from a purely libertarian perspective, should never have 
been allowed to come into existence, even at the state level. The government shouldn’t be 
allowed to tax citizens and confiscate their wealth for the purpose of giving that wealth to other 
citizens. Force and fraud are the only justifications for government taxation and interference 
from the libertarian perspective. The fact that there may be old widows or orphaned children 
who may have been completely at the mercy of nature and their fellow citizen’s charity is not 
enough for the ideologically pure libertarian to alter their belief in the superiority of property 
rights. From the libertarian perspective, the solution to the welfare problem was to end the 
welfare program altogether and rely on private charity to support those in need. 
Egalitarians have a different motive. Any program that shifts resources from those who 
have more to those who have less, is a good program. As long as poor people are given more 
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resources, it doesn’t really matter for egalitarians, how those resources are procured, and 
whether one is utterly dependent on the government for them. The fact that someone could 
potentially sell their labor on the free market for a wage instead of receiving a check from the 
government is of little or no concern to the egalitarian. In fact, generation after generation of 
welfare dependence would probably be superior for egalitarians than having someone be 
exploited by the wage system. The egalitarian solution to the welfare system would likely be to 
provide either more welfare or higher wages (determined by the government) with guaranteed, 
perhaps compulsory, work. 
The fact is that none of these ideologies were adequate when it came to reforming 
welfare in 1996. Only conservatism offered a palatable solution. The goal announced from both 
sides was to diminish dependence on the part of welfare recipients as much as possible by 
limiting the amount of time they could spend on welfare and by encouraging recipients to enter 
the workforce via training and other programs. This reform neither ended welfare nor 
expanded it. The reform wasn’t justified by any particular religious view. A fairly major public 
policy was substantially altered. The reform was undeniably conservative. 
When President Bill Clinton signed the reform, he said the act “gives us a chance we 
haven’t had before to break the cycle of dependency that has existed for millions and millions 
of our fellow citizens, exiling them from the world of work. It gives structure, meaning and 
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dignity to most of our lives.”77 Notice that diminishing dependency is the primary aim and 
justification of the reform.  
Thus far, the paper has given examples of durable independence as a living ideology 
that was especially visible from the period between 1995 and 2000, resulting in limiting the 
federal government’s dependence on debt, avoidance of military intervention that did not 
protect American independence, and limiting social welfare dependence. These issues in 
particular helped distinguish conservatism from classical liberalism or libertarianism and the 
oligarchy. An often unrecognized political shift took place in the 2000 election cycle, though. 
Many of the conservatives who had signed on to the “Contract with America” had made 
voluntary term-limit promises. Of the 11 politicians who made non-binding promises to not 
seek re-election in the year 2000, eight of them kept their pledge. In addition, the leaders of the 
“Contract with America” Newt Gingrich and House Budget Chairman John Kasich also did not 
seek re-election in the year 2000. In 2002, 4 out of 5 pledges did not seek re-election. In 2004, 7 
out of 18 kept their pledge, and by 2006 out of 10 pledges nobody honored their term-limit 
pledge. 78 
The point here is not to debate the advocacy of term-limits, but instead to show that the 
portion of the conservative cohort of 1994 that advocated for the conservative policies 
between 1995-2000 who were the most honest, began leaving congress in 2000. They had 
almost completely exited by the 2004 elections. This point is important because one might look 
at the number of Republicans in the House from 1994 to 2006 and come to the monolithic 
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conclusion that these representatives were of the same ideology, when in fact, there was a 
significant shift away from conservatism beginning in the year 2000 and towards oligarchy 
which had come to fruition in Congress between 2002 and 2004. With regard to military 
interventionism, part of the shift might be explained by the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 2001, but 
with regard to other issues at least some of the ideological shift had to do with those 
conservatives who honored their term-limits beginning in the year 2000. The main point, once 
again, is simply to make the case that the composition of Congress post-2000 was quite 
different than it was between 1995 and 2000, particularly within the Republican Party. 
This will be important in the next section of the paper where distinctions will be drawn 
between the Bush presidency, the “Contract with America” cohort, and the Tea Party 
movement. These distinctions are important because they will highlight the difference between 
the popularity (or unpopularity) of conservatism defined as traditional conservatism which 
promotes durable independence, neo/oligarchic conservatism which promotes money-making, 
and laissez-faire or libertarian-leaning conservatism which promotes individual freedom.  
To summarize this chapter, in response to the objection that traditional conservatism 
which promotes durable independence is no longer a living tradition, the paper pointed out 
that other ideologies could not adequately explain the welfare reform of 1996, the limiting of 
the federal budget, and the avoidance of military intervention from the years 1995-2000. 
Additionally, the paper argued that the composition of Congress changed after the year 2000 
even though Congress stayed in the hands of Republicans until 2006, and so we should not 
necessarily assume ideological continuity in the Republican Party from 1995 through 2006. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
POPULARITY OF TRADITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
 
America has a two-party political system. Because we have two dominant political 
parties, America is often assumed to have two dominant political ideologies which roughly 
correspond to the political parties. Currently, most people describe Democrats as being 
“Liberals” and Republicans as being “Conservatives”. “Liberals”, as they are referred to in this 
sense, are usually thought to include those who could be described as “progressive 
egalitarians”. Of course, there may be all sorts of other variants of Democrats, but usually if 
someone’s views deviate too far from progressive egalitarianism a more specific label is 
applied, like “socialist” or “communist” or “blue dog” etc. Nevertheless, when in common 
language we refer to “liberals” in America, we have a general idea that their views are going to 
be fairly close to John Rawls’s or Ronald Dworkin’s philosophies. 
This section of the paper will reply to the possible objection that when we say 
“Conservative” in America, in practice, we are not referring to those traditional conservatives 
who valued durable independence, but instead, that we are referring to people who value 
something else. The paper will argue that there is evidence to suggest that the other potential 
variants of modern conservatism one might be referring to when they say “Conservatives” 
(religious orthodoxy, laissez-faire, and oligarchic) are a tiny minority of the Republican Party, 
and, an unpopular minority both within the Republican Party and among the general 
electorate. For this reason, just as more specific names are given to those who fall outside the 
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“Liberal” norm, the paper argues that we need to use more specific names to refer to those 
minority ideologies that fall outside the traditional “Conservative” norm, and that when we 
normally refer to conservatives it should be understood that we are referring to people who 
primarily value durable independence. 
In Ethan Fishman and Kenneth Deutsch’s 2010 book The Dilemmas of Conservatism they 
claim that “A battle is being waged in the United States for the soul of conservatism. Its 
combatants are three major variants of the contemporary American conservative movement: 
traditional conservatism, laissez-faire conservatism, and neo-conservatism.”79 Fishman and 
Deutsch describe traditional conservatism as being based on the philosophies of Aristotle and 
Edmund Burke, and list its best contemporary defender as Russell Kirk. This “traditional 
conservatism” it was argued in the first section of this paper is best understood as valuing 
durable independence. Even if one objects to the argument that durable independence explains 
Burke’s philosophy, this section of the paper will still make the case that “traditional 
conservatism”, so long as it is not confused with religious orthodoxy, laissez-faire, or oligarchic 
motivations, still explains modern conservatism better than those alternative positions, even if 
politicians do not always follow up their conservative rhetoric in practice. 
The second competing variant of conservatism the authors note is what they call 
“laissez-faire conservatism”.  “There are two types of laissez-faire conservatism in the United 
States: economic liberalism, which applies natural law standards to social issues such as speech, 
press, sex, and marriage, but not to economics; and libertarianism, which applies laissez-faire 
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across the board to all aspects of human behavior. Economic liberalism is the most popular 
variant of American conservatism. As a whole, laissez-faire conservatives fear the threat posed 
by weak and envious people to risk-taking entrepreneurs who seek to produce wealth both for 
themselves and for society…Traditional conservatives and laissez-faire conservatives inevitably 
find themselves in conflict over the issue of amoral capitalism.”80  
The third competing variant described by the authors is ‘Neo-conservatism”. According 
to them “This variant of American conservatism rose to prominence during the administration 
of George W. Bush. Best described as a persuasion or a perspective rather than a movement, it 
represents a reaction against the advocates of the liberal welfare state, radical liberationist 
values, idealist foreign policies, and affirmative action.” Without writing a lengthy response to 
the authors’ description of neo-conservatism, this paper will refer to them as oligarchs. The 
pursuit of money via state subsidized capitalism, the promoting of military interventions around 
the world to secure natural resources or to open markets, the rejection of aid to the needy 
unless it ensures corporate profits, the promotion of corporate money in politics, the perpetual 
pursuit of political power by one or a few families, etc. These are all easily explained by 
oligarchic values. For this reason, I shall call this group oligarchic conservatives, and agree with 
the authors that the most recent and archetypal example is President George W. Bush. 
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The Unpopularity of Religious Orthodoxy 
There have been several efforts to make the distinction between religious orthodoxy 
and conservatism in this paper. It is possible, however, that one may look at the more religious 
wing of the Republican Party and assume that religious orthodox values are popular within the 
Republican Party. While it may be true that religious orthodox views do exist, true religious 
orthodoxy is likely quite rare in American politics. 
Let us take a description that Ronald Dworkin uses to describe the difference between a 
tolerant religious community and tolerant secular society with regard to the issue of public-
school prayer. “In a tolerant religious community, there can be no objection in principle to 
teachers leading schoolchildren in prayer. Such prayers must of course be designed to be as 
ecumenical as possible; the Lord’s Prayer, which I recited every day in school, would serve. 
However, a tolerant religious state must take care not to coerce children into reciting even so 
ecumenical a prayer as that, because it must leave them free to reject religion altogether. 
Perhaps simply allowing children who so choose to remain seated and silent would protect 
them from coercion. But perhaps not; it might be that children would be reluctant to identify 
themselves as outsiders in that way and would be pressured into reciting prayers in which they 
did not believe. Whether prayers would in the end be permitted in public schools in a tolerant 
religious society would depend on how that empirical psychological issue is resolved. 
“In a tolerant secular society, however, that empirical question would be irrelevant.”81 
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Notice what a tolerant religious society is not. It is not a society that promotes a 
particular religious orthodoxy. It does not say that everyone must attend the State Church. But 
it may practice long held religious traditions like prayers before sporting events, manger scenes 
in the public square at Christmas time, reciting the word “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
printing the words “In God We Trust” on our money. In America today, the defense of religious 
traditions or references to God like these hardly represent a religious orthodoxy. 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of this comes from the common conservative reference 
to America as a “Judeo-Christian” nation, or a nation founded on “Judeo-Christian” values. If 
this popular and common reference among the “religious right” were truly a religious 
orthodoxy view it would have to choose between whether it was Jewish or Christian, and 
probably whether it was Protestant or Catholic, and maybe it may require something even 
more specific than that. The notion that America was founded as a “Judeo-Christian” nation 
only makes sense as a reference to culture and tradition, not as a reference to a specific 
religious orthodoxy. And it is from this reference to culture and tradition that the more religious 
wing of the Republican Party conceivably gets its popularity. 
It is against those who wish to altogether deny any reference to or belief in the 
existence of God in the public arena, and those who wish to create a tolerant secular society, 
instead of a tolerant religious society, at whom most of the religious right is responding to. This 
response usually falls squarely in the bounds of, and gains its political power from, the basic 
principles of traditional conservatism; namely, the principal that a higher power is responsible 
for life, and that long-standing cultural traditions, including religious traditions, probably serve 
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some useful function in society and shouldn’t be disregarded due to claims of individual rights. 
It is likely that when conservatives claim that prayers should be said in school it is not primarily 
because they think that making children say prayers will save their souls or convert them to any 
particular religion. It is likely because they think there are positive consequences that will result 
from the ritual of prayer-saying. Those who promote activities like school prayer-saying on the 
basis that those prayers will save souls probably exist, but they are also probably very rare in 
America, and extremely unpopular, even in the religious wing of the Republican Party.  
 
The Unpopularity of Laissez-Faire “Conservatism” 
In order to make the case that Laissez-Faire “Conservatism” is an outlier in the battle for 
the soul of conservatism, this section of the paper will trace the political maneuvering of the 
Paul family, whom this paper takes to be the current archetype of laissez-faire conservatism. In 
order to incorporate both laissez-faire conservatism as libertarianism and as economic 
liberalism, an example will be chosen from both the purely economic category, and one from 
the social category in order to demonstrate the unpopularity of both these views and how the 
recent ascendance, however so modest, of the Ron and Rand Paul in conservative circles has 
more to do with their move away from laissez-faire conservatism and toward traditional 
conservatism. 
If we begin by following Ron Paul’s political career in the late 1970s we see that he was 
an early supporter of Ronald Reagan in 1976. During the middle of Reagan’s term, however, 
Paul withdrew his support for Reagan and the Republican Party and instead ran for President as 
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a Libertarian in 1988. The reason for this departure was because of Reagan’s handling of the 
federal budget, which had ballooned during Reagan’s time as President.82 Thus far, Paul’s 
political maneuvering is consistent with one of the proxy measures—federal spending—that 
the paper has described earlier as being a measure of traditional conservatism. Additionally, 
Paul returned to the Republican Party in 1996 during the years the paper has identified as being 
particularly conservative. In this sense there is quite a lot of overlap on some issues, like the 
size of the federal budget, in which laisse-faire and traditional conservatism are generally in 
agreement. 
The disagreement comes when we examine why they agree. The laisse-faire view is 
ultimately rooted in a belief in a priori individual rights, particularly the right of ownership of 
oneself. This means that for the libertarian laisse-faire conservative, when a central bank loans 
money it did not collect in deposits, there is a violation of rights involved in the transaction. Or, 
when someone wishes to use drugs that will damage their mind and body, an individual still has 
a right to put into their body what they wish from the libertarian perspective. These are wildly 
unpopular views. In the 1988 Presidential campaign, Paul received 0.5% of the popular vote. 
Granted, it is difficult to run as a third party candidate in American politics, but just two years 
later, another fiery Texan, Ross Perot, garnered 18.91% of the popular vote. Notably, Perot’s 
main issues during the campaign were the national debt (with which Perot and Paul agreed) 
and his disapproval of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. With regard to 
NAFTA, Paul’s libertarian position is for free trade agreements like NAFTA.  
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Essentially, what this shows is that while there was strong support for reduced federal 
spending, which is consistent with conservatism, there isn’t a whole lot of support for free 
trade based on individual rights, or on Paul’s other issues like legalizing drugs like heroin, 
abolishing the central bank, allowing unlimited immigration, or undoing all of the New Deal for 
strictly philosophical reasons, none of which are consistent with traditional conservatism. 
Even if we strike out the strictly social libertarian issues, we are still left with the 
elimination of all social safety nets, and probably unlimited free trade and immigration. It is 
worth noting at this point that the case study presented earlier in this paper regarding the 
Welfare Reform of 1996 didn’t eliminate welfare, which would be what laisse-faire 
conservatism would require. It simply attempted to reform welfare so that less people would 
become dependent on it, and shifted some responsibilities to the states. These reforms were 
designed to limit dependency and increase independence; they did not declare the 
metaphysical unjustness of any government welfare. The reforms of 1996 were very popular 
and President Clinton signed the reforms in August just three months before the 1996 
elections. Bills that are not popular do not pass directly before a major election in America. It’s 
therefore fair to say that if the reforms had eliminated all government welfare, they might not 
have been so popular. 
 Perhaps someone is willing to grant what has been argued so far about laisse-faire 
conservatism’s unpalatability, but then poses the question of what explains the rise of Ron and 
Rand Paul since 2007? First, we should examine Ron Paul’s performance in the Republican 
Primary of 2008. In that primary he finished fourth in most of the primary and caucus contests, 
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he did not win a single state, and attracted around 3%-6% of the Republican Primary votes.83 In 
the 2012 Republican Primary, Paul fared slightly better, averaging 3rd in the primaries he 
actively campaigned in, but he still was not able to gather enough support to even be the 
Republicans’ second choice for President.  
Perhaps the biggest accomplishment for the laisse-faire representatives was the 
election of Ron Paul’s son, Rand Paul, in the 2010 Kentucky Senate race, in which the younger 
Paul—who holds similar views as his father—won both the primary and the general election for 
the Senate, and who is now being considered as a contender in the 2016 Republican 
presidential primary. Time will tell how well Paul will do, but one might make the case that the 
laisse-faire ideology has been gaining ground since 1988 when Ron Paul only attracted 0.5% of 
the total votes in America. It isn’t unthinkable that Rand Paul could have a respectable showing 
and finish first or second in the 2016 Republican primary if this rise in popularity continues. 
What explains this rise in popularity? Are people becoming more attracted to laissez-faire 
conservatism? 
The evidence actually suggests that it is not that laissez-faire conservatism has become 
more popular, but that the Pauls have shifted their ideology (Rand more than Ron) more 
toward traditional conservatism since 2008, and that it is that shift which has made the Pauls 
more popular. What is it they have changed?  
The key shift was from initially identifying with libertarianism, to more recently referring 
to their ideology as “constitutional conservatism”. What this shift represents is a move from 
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promoting an emphasis on the individual rights found in libertarianism, to an emphasis on 
limiting the size and power of the federal government via the promotion of 10th Amendment to 
the Constitution. One only needs to read three pages into the chapter on “Constitutional 
Conservatism” in Rand Paul’s book The Tea Party Goes to Washington before one reads about 
the importance of the 10th amendment. “The 10th amendment explicitly says “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the State, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
“So strong is the regard for the Tenth Amendment that various offshoots of the Tea 
Party have formed completely devoted to it.”84 What often goes unnoticed here is that a shift 
has taken place from a promotion of libertarian and laissez-faire individual rights, to something 
closer to traditional conservatism. For example, if we examine the legislation signed by Mitt 
Romney when he was Governor of Massachusetts that required the citizens of Massachusetts 
to purchase health insurance, commonly referred to as RomneyCare, we find that from the 
laissez-faire point of view, this legislation was a violation of individual rights because the 
“government” is only justified in collecting taxes to protect us from force or fraud. The laissez-
faire position makes no distinction between state and federal government.  Rhetorically at 
least, “constitutional conservatism”, by promoting the dominance of the 10th amendment does 
just that. It allows for those rights perceived by libertarians to be violated by the state 
government, just not by the federal government. 
While a traditional conservative will allow whatever government is empirically judged to 
have a history of promoting the most durable independence for citizens, it is often the case that 
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a traditional conservative will choose state governments over federal government whenever 
possible because the traditional conservative knows that the dangers associated with the 
competing ideologies of oligarchy and egalitarianism both require a highly centralized state in 
order to be effective in implementing their goals. Because of this, it is common for traditional 
conservatives to have a bias toward more local governments and to have a bias toward limiting 
the spending of the federal government. These efforts, as the paper has already shown, were 
quite popular from 1995 to 2000. What “constitutional conservatism” has done, is rhetorically 
mask (or shift) the laissez-faire ideology behind support for the 10th Amendment in an effort to 
make the laissez-faire ideology appear more like traditional conservatism, and this is what likely 
explains the rise of the popularity of laissez-faire conservatism in the case of Rand Paul and a 
few other successful Tea Party members. Were it not for this shift toward something that more 
closely aligns with traditional conservatism, the popularity of laissez-faire ideology would likely 
be somewhere back down in the low single digits of the electorate. 
 
The Unpopularity of Oligarchy 
There are two factors that make oligarchs in America especially difficult to distinguish 
from conservatives. The first is that Americans, in carrying on the tradition noted by Edmond 
Burke in the case of England, tend to use money as a principal measure of independence. So, 
one would expect that much of the time, oligarchic interests and conservative interests might 
overlap. The second factor that makes oligarchs difficult to distinguish from conservatives is 
that they usually do not announce themselves as oligarchs, and quite often use conservative 
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rhetoric during election campaigns if they are Republicans (if they are Democrats, then they use 
egalitarian rhetoric). For these reasons, the scholar who wishes to distinguish conservative 
politicians from oligarchs and also measure the popularity or unpopularity of those ideologies 
must examine particular actions the politician took, identify those actions as being clearly 
distinguishable as either an oligarchic action or a conservative action, and then gauge the 
reaction of the conservative constituency. If the conservative constituency consistently reacts 
positively to oligarchic actions, then one could make the case that conservatism in 21st century 
America can be explained by the pursuit of money and restriction of political office to an elite 
few. If the conservative constituency consistently reacts negatively to oligarchic policies that 
clearly do not overlap with conservative policies, then we should consider whether 
conservatism can really be explained by oligarchic actions. 
Consider this: never has there been a Republican candidate for President who ran on a 
platform in the primary election that as President they would secure natural resources through 
violence and war abroad85, double the national debt, increase social and corporate welfare86, 
bail out large banks, and allow massive amounts of illegal immigration87. Rarely, does anyone 
claim that these actions are representative of conservative values. Yet, these are exactly the 
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actions that were taken by President George W. Bush over the course of his eight years as 
President. 
These are all actions we might expect an oligarch to take. We would expect them to 
secure both markets and vital resources through violence if necessary. We would expect them 
to funnel money to business interests through government spending. We would expect them to 
support large corporations. We would expect them to support importing cheap labor into the 
United States so that businesses could make bigger profits. 
The question is whether or not these actions also primarily define conservatism. The 
fact that these are not consistently promoted actions in Republican primary campaigns is one 
sign that these do not represent conservatism. It is possible, however, that conservatives 
themselves support these issues, but that they know they are not popular with the wider 
electorate, and so, in order to not alienate potential voters in the general election, 
conservatives try to keep the rhetoric regarding these issues to a minimum in the primary. If 
this is the case, we must look at the conservative reaction to these policy decisions that were 
made under the George W. Bush Administration. We would expect that if conservatives did not 
agree with oligarchic policies, and that if oligarchic policies did not define the vast majority of 
conservatives, that there would be a negative reaction to these policies…and there was. It 
ultimately manifested itself in the Tea Party movement. 
There are a variety of ways the Tea Party movement has manifested itself in American 
politics, but the most straightforward understanding of the movement is that it was a reaction 
both against oligarchy, and against egalitarianism. The central aim of the movement is to limit 
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the size, scope, and spending of the federal government and to preserve what is understood to 
be long-standing American traditions and culture. In most respects, the Tea Party movement is 
indistinguishable from the conservative movement spearheaded by the “Contract with 
America” in 1994. The main difference between the two is that post 9/11, conservatives have 
been more likely to support military intervention abroad88 (though this has certainly waned in 
recent years). But even if we accept that Tea Party conservatives are more hawkish than their 
predecessors, they are also much more likely to care about border security than they are about 
placing ground troops in Syria, Libya or Yemen. Since the use of military force has become more 
ambiguous, the remainder of the paper will instead focus on a handful of other issues that 
illustrate the negative reaction of conservatives to oligarchic policies. 
The policies we will examine, beginning in the year 2001 and ending in the year 2015, 
are immigration, corporate and social welfare, and federal spending. Oligarchic and laissez-faire 
variants of conservatism cannot adequately account for the opposition to immigration, 
naturalization and amnesty in the Republican Party. Oligarchs have an interest in promoting 
access to cheap labor for businesses which cannot easily be exported overseas (i.e.  fruit 
pickers, meat packers, domestic servants, and hospitality workers). Jeb Bush (George W. Bush’s 
brother) is actively supporting naturalizing most of the illegal immigrants currently in the 
country and thinks that large amounts of immigration is a good thing.89 Rand Paul thinks that 
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labor has a right, just like capital does, to move between borders.90 So if laisse-faire 
conservatism is the dominant form of conservatism, why is there so much opposition, including 
from Tea Party presidential candidate Senator Ted Cruz, about immigration?91 And why was 
“The most recent push to pass immigration reform, during the George W. Bush 
Administration…scuttled in large part because grass-roots conservatives rose up against the 
effort.”92  
Some may say that this situation is explained by xenophobia or simple racism within the 
Republican Party. But the findings of Nate Silver at FiveThirtyEight show that when the proper 
conditions are attached to the approval of immigration naturalization, like increasing border 
security and requiring immigrants to learn English, support for immigration reform by 
Republicans increases on average by 35 points.93 That change doesn’t seem to support the 
xenophobia or racism claim. 
So what does explain this large group of the Republican electorate who currently 
oppose our lax immigration policy? The most likely explanation is that they are traditional 
conservatives. We would expect traditional conservatives to oppose illegal immigration for two 
reasons. The first reason is that massive amounts of immigrants coming into the country cannot 
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properly acclimate and adopt America’s culture and traditions (usually measured by speaking 
English and following established laws and cultural norms). The second reason is that often 
immigrants are poor and are in need of social welfare, especially if they have children. 
Conservatives may worry that if these immigrants are naturalized and become citizens, they will 
effectively vote for egalitarian politicians as a form of patronage, exchanging their votes for the 
promise of welfare benefits, thereby creating the type of long-lasting dependence that 
conservatives loathe.  
So, traditional conservatism can potentially explain why many Republicans wouldn’t 
support a blanket immigration reform, but would likely do so if conditions were met that would 
mitigate their concerns about uncontrolled immigration and political patronage. In any event, 
neither oligarchy nor laissez-faire variants of conservatism can explain the large amount of 
opposition to a more open immigration policy in the Republican Party, even at a time when 
Republicans are somewhat desperate for Latino votes.94 
The second issue that can serve to distinguish the oligarchic presidency of G.W. Bush 
from conservatism is welfare, both social and corporate. As President, Bush added an entire 
new welfare program to Medicare (Part D). At first glance, this might not seem like an oligarchic 
policy at all, until one takes a closer look at the details of the plan. According to one left-wing 
user and critic of the plan, “As Congress debated what was to become the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003, drug companies, insurance companies, HMOS, industry trade 
associations, and advocacy groups spent more than $140 million on lobbying and deployed at 
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least 952 lobbyists, according to a 2004 Public Citizen report. Their biggest priority: to prevent a 
system in which the government had the power to negotiate drug prices, as it does in 
purchases for the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense, and the Public 
Health Service. 
It worked. "Drug company lobbyists were unbelievably successful in getting a sentence 
put in the legislation saying the government cannot negotiate or set prices," notes Dr. Sidney 
Wolfe, director of Public Citizen's Health Research Group. "And once you had that, it became 
pure privatization, a free-enterprise system."95 As a result “In fact, one of the Medicare 
Modernization Act's biggest handouts to the drug industry was its reclassification of 6.2 million 
low-income elderly and disabled people who had been receiving drug coverage through the 
Medicaid program. The new law forced these people into Part D; now the government 
subsidizes the same drugs at higher prices. According to the 2007 House report, that change 
alone stood to increase drug company profits by an estimated $2.8 billion in 2007.”96 And the 
key takeaway is “None of these measures addresses the core weakness of the program—its 
obligations to the insurance and drug industries. Medicare Part D is a small-scale model of just 
the kind of system some Democrats, including Barack Obama, now propose—a government-
subsidized health insurance plan, one that preserves the profits of private middlemen at a high 
cost to citizens' and government coffers.”97 
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One would expect that if Medicare Part D was not oligarchic by design that citizens on 
the left would have been supportive. Yet, the analysis quoted above was not at all uncommon 
when the legislation was passed. Viewed properly, Medicare Part D was a subsidy for both drug 
companies and insurance companies, which is exactly what we would expect from an oligarch.  
Gigantic subsidies for the private sector didn’t end there during the Bush administration. 
There were also large subsidies for big agriculture companies, energy companies98 and 
protectionist measures were put in place to protect both ethanol producers99 and steel 
producers100. Additionally, large loans were given to banks in 2008 under the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, in order to bail them out of financial collapse.101  
There isn’t any principal per se that would prevent a conservative from perhaps 
supporting some of these policies. It may indeed be the case that TARP was the best solution to 
a serious financial problem, and that economic collapse would have threatened the financial 
independence of millions of Americans. However, taken as a whole, when almost every policy 
an administration enacts favors large corporate interests, oligarchic values seem to explain 
much more of the behavior. 
This brings us to our final and perhaps most consistent measure of conservatism: federal 
spending. Since conservatives recognize that sometimes government, including the federal 
government, does need to take broad, and perhaps expensive, actions to support durable 
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independence, federal debt itself is not always a vital concern for conservatives. As was pointed 
out earlier in the paper, some debt may enhance independence in the long-run. However, 
federal spending and national debt are used as a proxy by conservatives for how well over-all 
the central government is abiding by conservative principles. Exponentially and ever increasing 
amounts of federal debt, from a conservative point of view, is a sign that probably both people 
and businesses are becoming too dependent on the central government. And dependence, 
from a conservative point of view, is a very undesirable thing. 
Figure 2: US Debt Ceiling Graph102 
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 “Initially, Tea Party protests followed a script that mostly reflected the aspirations of 
the movement investors, with early Tea Party protests focused heavily on President Obama’s 
health care initiative, but in fairly short order, local Tea Party groups took initiative in defining 
their own goals and did not always share an agenda with the monied interests supporting the 
movement, for example in their opposition to raising the debt ceiling.”103  
Few if any studies or theses have been put forward that directly tie the Tea Party 
Movement to the Contract with America cohort while excluding G.W. Bush as this paper 
suggests should be done. But in 2010, one Tea Party group did attempt to make the connection 
by generating and issuing a “Contract from America” in which people voted online for their top 
ten issues for the 2010 election. The one common theme among all ten was that they aimed at 
taking away power from the federal government by limiting taxes, spending, and regulations. 
(Noticeably absent from the list was a demand for term-limits. Apparently these conservatives 
had learned their lesson after 2000.)104 
If we accept that in practice, exponential federal debt is an important concern for 
conservatives who value independence, we can see the disconnect between oligarchic as well 
as egalitarian policies, and those which are usually considered conservative. One might view the 
Tea Party as a simple reaction against the presidency of Barack Obama, but that doesn’t explain 
the increase of Republican primary challenges beginning in 2010.105 The Tea Party movement at 
the federal level hasn’t been inconsistent with traditional conservatism. Despite the fact that 
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funding for some Tea Party organizations has come from monied interests, those interests are 
usually libertarian-leaning interests rather than strictly oligarchic interests. The fact that Tea 
Party candidate Ted Cruz could give a speech in Iowa at a forum hosted by a large ethanol 
producer about why Cruz does not support ethanol mandates or subsidies for agribusiness, is 
one example of how monied interests do not always have the influence they are assumed to 
have among Tea Party politicians. 
The most straightforward analysis of the Tea Party is that laissez-faire conservatives and 
traditional conservatives have joined forces against both oligarchic and egalitarian policies at 
the federal level. What is interesting is that the Tea Party is almost exclusively active at the 
federal level. State level Tea Party activity is hardly noticeable. Part of the reason for that is 
because, as was addressed earlier in the paper, laissez-faire conservatives have either adopted 
more traditional conservatism, or masked their philosophy behind the 10th amendment. If they 
were to make serious bids for state governments while remaining consistent to their 
philosophy, then which side of the fence they stand on (the side with a strong sense of 
individual rights or the side dedicated to promoting durable independence) would likely be 
revealed, and the laissez-faire conservatives would likely not be popular enough to get elected. 
But at the federal level, at least, the lines are drawn with libertarians and conservatives 
on one side united against large amounts of federal spending, debt and welfare, and, on the 
other side, egalitarians and oligarchs committed to issues that require large amounts of 
spending and debt, albeit for different reasons.  
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In terms of palatability, and whether oligarchic values have been the dominant values of 
the Republican Party over the past twenty years, this paper has made the case that during 
those years from 1995-2000 when Republicans instituted more conservative policies, they were 
quite popular both within the Republican Party and among the general electorate. And that 
when the Republican Party shifted toward oligarchic control from 2001-2008, and when the 
Republican Presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012 were both oligarchic,106 the party was 
soundly defeated and increasingly lost support both within the party and among the general 
electorate. While it is true that laissez-faire and traditional conservatives are both currently 
united under the Tea Party banner, and have been very successful as a movement, the paper 
has already shown that the laissez-faire wing of the party hasn’t traditionally had that much 
popularity in the party, or among the general electorate, and that the extent that they do now 
is mostly a result of a rhetorical ideological shift away from strict individualism and toward 
traditional conservatism via the propping up of the 10th amendment. 
Ultimately, what we are left with is a very unpopular laissez-faire ideology, a very 
unpopular oligarchic ideology, and a very popular traditional conservative ideology that while 
effective when focusing on federal spending and debt, has yet to fully recognize and articulate 
their ideology to the public on a consistent basis. The fact remains, however, that the 
underlying value of durable independence is likely far more popular and palatable than the 
other competing conservative variants. And because of this, when we refer to “conservatives” 
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in American, we ought to primarily be referring to those who, like Burke, value durable 
independence. 
  
89 
 
CHAPTER 7: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Conservatism has been a notoriously difficult ideology to define. This makes 
conservatism an especially difficult subject for political scientists to study. For example, if we 
want to measure if egalitarianism is successful, we can see in what respect people are equal; if 
we want to measure how free people are, we can measure their political rights; if we want to 
measure how happy people are, we can do satisfaction surveys. But, how would a political 
scientist who wished to measure how conservative a population is do so without a clear 
definition of conservatism?  
If we were to assume that up to 40% of the population of the United States are 
conservatives (as we commonly refer to them), then without an adequate definition of 
conservatism, political scientists simply cannot properly study over one-third of the population. 
For this reason, properly defining conservatism should be of utmost importance for political 
scientists. If the dominant form of conservatism in the United States does value durable 
independence, then conservatism isn’t being measured properly by political scientists.  
This paper has made the case that traditionally conservatism has been defined by the 
value of durable independence as exemplified by Edmond Burke. Additionally, the paper has 
put forth some plausible reasons why durable independence might still define conservatism, 
and better explain conservatism’s popularity than other potential conservative variants. For 
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these reasons, when we refer to conservatives we should be referring to those people whose 
primary value is durable independence. And, if a politician expresses views that value 
something more highly than durable independence (like money, orthodoxy, or individual 
freedom), then they should be referred to as something else other than conservatives.  
In terms of further research, a suggested starting point might be a meta-analysis of what 
types of variables have been previously used to study “conservatives”, and to compare those 
variables to those we might derive from durable independence. For example, if we take the 
school-prayer question from earlier in this paper. It would not be enough to inquire about one’s 
position on whether they approve or disapprove of public school-prayer if we wish to examine 
the true conservative view. Instead, it would be more beneficial to ask whether they primarily 
promote school-prayer because they think doing so will reduce crime, or diminish divorce, or 
improve school performance, or, whether it is for strictly religious reasons.  
There are a wide variety of issues and ways to measure things that might require 
adjustment if we are take into account and isolate the conservative view, but first meta-studies 
should be conducted to see how much of this has already been done. Of course, the next step 
would be to design inquiries and measurements that fill the gaps in knowledge, which take the 
conservative view as durable independence into consideration, perhaps ultimately culminating 
in the construction of a Conservative Index, or Indexes. 
In any event, conservatives are worthy of ongoing and serious study, and the hope is 
that this paper might contribute something that will help make future hypotheses about 
conservatives more accurate. Ultimately, we cannot define conservatism by the words and 
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actions of a few modern leaders. We have to look to the conservative electorate and see how 
they respond to both the rhetoric and actions taken by so-called “conservative” politicians. 
Only in this way can we hope to understand just what it means to be a conservative today. I 
think that if this research is conducted, we will find—just like a careful examination of Burke 
found—that the value of durable independence is what best explains the political views of 
conservatives, and that those who value something else more highly than durable 
independence should not be referred to as conservatives. 
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